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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, kyle@mcmartin.ca,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing
Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 15:20:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7474.1337782847@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87obpfxdpr.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>

Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> wrote:

>         That's pretty weird.  Why not put the "@This Is A Crypto Signed
> Module\n" before the signature?  Then module-size is implied: everything
> before that signature.  The signature size is implied: everything after
> that signature.

This makes it simpler.  No scanning required.  The magic number can only be in
one place and you can find it by dead reckoning.

>         In fact, I'd modify this slightly, to allow multiple signatures.
> This would work nicely with a deterministic strip.  Find the signatures
> backward, and truncate as they fail.

Why would you want multiple signatures?  That just complicates things.  If
you're in FIPS mode, you probably have to panic if any of them fail.

I suppose I may as well punt the signature detection and removal to userspace
and pass the signature as an argument to init_module() as Dmitry suggested.
Then the signature need not be in the file at all (he wants to use an xattr or
hardware, I think).  mkinitrd and rpmbuild/kernel spec have to be changed to
accommodate enablement of these patches, so why not module-init-tools, dracut
and busybox whilst we're at it?

David

  reply	other threads:[~2012-05-23 14:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-05-22 23:02 [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 01/23] Guard check in module loader against integer overflow David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 02/23] KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 03/23] KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 04/23] KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 05/23] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 06/23] KEYS: Add signature verification facility David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 07/23] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key subtype David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 08/23] KEYS: RSA signature verification algorithm David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 09/23] Fix signature verification for shorter signatures David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 10/23] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 11/23] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 12/23] PGPLIB: Signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 13/23] KEYS: PGP data parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 14/23] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 15/23] KEYS: PGP format signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 16/23] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 17/23] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 18/23] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 19/23] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 20/23] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 21/23] MODSIGN: Module signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 22/23] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 23/23] MODSIGN: Panic the kernel if FIPS is enabled upon module signing failure David Howells
2012-05-23 12:51 ` [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing Rusty Russell
2012-05-23 14:20   ` David Howells [this message]
2012-05-24 12:04     ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-24 14:00       ` David Howells
2012-05-27  5:41         ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-31 14:11           ` David Howells
2012-05-31 15:35           ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-04  1:16             ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-04 13:38               ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-05  0:23                 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22  1:53           ` Greg KH
2012-06-22  3:29             ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-06-22  4:05             ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22 11:03               ` David Howells
2012-06-23  0:20                 ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-25 11:15       ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-05-25 11:37         ` David Howells
2012-05-25 13:08           ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-25 13:53             ` David Howells
2012-05-25 14:40               ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-25 12:18 ` David Howells
2012-05-25 15:42 ` David Howells
2012-06-04  1:31   ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-04 12:47     ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05  1:05       ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-05 11:39         ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05 13:37           ` David Howells
2012-06-05 14:36             ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-06-05 13:35     ` David Howells
2012-06-10  5:47       ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-11  8:30         ` Kasatkin, Dmitry

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