From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Jianxiong Gao <jxgao@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] x86/devmem: Drop /dev/mem access for confidential guests
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 09:36:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <74d7d392-82ce-46b1-81ad-a5f1c1bdf62c@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMGD6P0ORZF6Tbkuedv99jEpk+6HjG=pyqCwTHKU5dVxt+kRCQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 4/28/25 09:30, Jianxiong Gao wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 28, 2025 at 8:53 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>> Would most developers reading this know what an "SEPT violation" is or
>> what its implications are?
>>
>> This results in an immediate exit from and termination of the TDX guest,
>> right?
>>
> In most cases yes but it depends on the settings.
There's also disable_sept_ve() in the kernel.
So perhaps I should have said:
This <normally*> results in an immediate exit from and
termination of the TDX guest right?
* Ignoring debug and other non-production silliness
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-28 16:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-17 19:11 [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:12 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/devmem: Remove duplicate range_is_allowed() definition Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:30 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-17 19:12 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/devmem: Drop /dev/mem access for confidential guests Dan Williams
2025-04-17 19:33 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-17 22:31 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-17 23:24 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-18 20:04 ` [PATCH v4 " Dan Williams
2025-04-22 13:38 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-23 17:18 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-23 20:36 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-24 6:35 ` Naveen N Rao
2025-04-28 15:53 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-28 16:30 ` Jianxiong Gao
2025-04-28 16:36 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2025-05-07 5:44 ` [PATCH v3 " kernel test robot
2025-04-22 14:09 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict devmem for confidential VMs Nikolay Borisov
2025-04-28 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-28 22:48 ` Dan Williams
2025-04-29 0:37 ` Dave Hansen
2025-04-30 15:41 ` Suzuki K Poulose
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