From: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 18:58:12 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <761791749.8594444.1377730692707.JavaMail.root@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1377729714.27493.2.camel@x230>
----- Original Message -----
> From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> To: "Lenny Szubowicz" <lszubowi@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org
> Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 6:41:55 PM
> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
>
> On Wed, 2013-08-28 at 18:37 -0400, Lenny Szubowicz wrote:
>
> > Did you purposely exclude similar checks for hibernate that were covered
> > by earlier versions of your patch set?
>
> Yes, I think it's worth tying it in with the encrypted hibernation
> support. The local attack is significantly harder in the hibernation
> case - in the face of unknown hardware it basically involves a
> pre-generated memory image corresponding to your system or the ability
> to force a reboot into an untrusted environment. I think it's probably
> more workable to just add a configuration option for forcing encrypted
> hibernation when secure boot is in use.
>
> --
> Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
I'm root. So I can write anything I want to the swap file that looks
like a valid hibernate image but is code of my choosing. I can read
anything I need from /dev/mem or /dev/kmem to help me do that.
I can then immediately initiate a reboot.
-Lenny.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-28 22:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-19 17:26 [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 15:57 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:14 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:10 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:37 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-30 20:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-30 23:41 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 10:51 ` joeyli
2013-09-04 12:01 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 13:13 ` joeyli
2013-08-19 17:34 ` [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Kees Cook
2013-08-28 22:37 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 22:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 22:58 ` Lenny Szubowicz [this message]
2013-08-28 23:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 23:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02 5:22 ` joeyli
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