From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Xu, Yilun" <yilun.xu@intel.com>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"baolu.lu@linux.intel.com" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
"Peng, Chao P" <chao.p.peng@intel.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "kas@kernel.org" <kas@kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"tglx@kernel.org" <tglx@kernel.org>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
"bhelgaas@google.com" <bhelgaas@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] TDX: Enable PCIe link encryption for trusted I/O
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 01:35:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <76f4fbf366451fe48d689ce9c8b231b9fe07338a.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116111037.3478844-1-chao.gao@intel.com>
On Mon, 2026-11-16 at 03:10 -0800, Chao Gao wrote:
> == Points for discussion ==
>
> 1. Raw DOE frames (See patch 3)
>
> The TDX module produces and consumes whole DOE objects, header included,
> but the PCI DOE API takes payloads only. The TDX-TSM driver therefore
> strips and rebuilds the DOE header itself. The code is small, but it
> puts DOE format details in a TSM driver, while the DOE core already
> handles them. A PCI DOE API that takes whole objects would keep them in
> the core, but the TDX-TSM driver would be its only user. Is such an API
> worth adding, or can we live with the DOE format handling in the
> TDX-TSM driver?
Why can't the TDX module return what we need? I guess AMD's firmware must
already return just the payload. Any idea what ARM will do?
>
> 2. Default IDE Stream (See patch 5)
>
> TDISP requires each device to have one default IDE stream [8]. The PCI
> core does not set Default Stream, so each TSM driver sets it itself, by
> looking up the device's IDE settings with pci_ide_to_settings() and
> setting default_stream. AMD's driver already does this, and the TDX-TSM
> driver does the same. Since the requirement is shared, the PCI core
> could instead set Default Stream on the device's TC0 stream, which is
> what TDISP expects. Should this move into the PCI core now, or can it be
> a later cleanup?
Not very sure on this point. Do you think the TSM drivers would never want to
pick a different default stream? If they did is there a point to moving it?
Might be better to wait to see how it shakes out.
>
> == Limitations ==
>
> The TDX module configures the root port's IDE settings and accepts
> only one address range for the stream. The root port therefore encrypts
> only traffic to the device's prefetchable MMIO range, and a device with
> no prefetchable range cannot be connected. We are evaluating whether
> this can be lifted.
Can you describe how it impacts the initial support here? Is it about enabling
more devices, or simplifying the initial code?
>
> Link encryption needs the root complex to enter a TDX mode, in which
> only the TDX module can configure the root port's IDE settings. The
> kernel opts in to this mode with TDH.IOMMU.SETUP. As its name suggests,
> this SEAMCALL also puts the IOMMU into TDX mode, which changes the
> IOMMU's behavior. Unfortunately, the two cannot be enabled separately,
> even though link encryption does not need IOMMU TDX mode.
Hmm, usually TDX is not easy to enable on a system. So users are not likely to
accidentally hit the existing limitations. So I'm thinking we just do the same
here. Document the limits and not add a switch. But the limits should be cleanly
handled and understood. Which is a WIP.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-21 1:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 11:10 [RFC PATCH 0/7] TDX: Enable PCIe link encryption for trusted I/O Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] coco/tdx-host: Create metadata for an SPDM session Chao Gao
2026-11-21 2:05 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] coco/tdx-host: Establish an SPDM session with the device Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] coco/tdx-host: Exchange SPDM messages through DOE Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] coco/tdx-host: Pass a device info buffer to tdh_spdm_connect() Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] coco/tdx-host: Configure an IDE stream Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] coco/tdx-host: Program IDE keys and enable the " Chao Gao
2026-11-16 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] x86/virt/tdx: Enable PCIe link encryption Chao Gao
2026-11-21 1:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
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