From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
To: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, john.allen@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 13:09:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7e8fdb9b30a9ffb405524c42ade277ba5dc81cb3.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <307dea63-ff53-4116-8752-f717d385cb9e@intel.com>
On Tue, 2023-12-12 at 16:56 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>
> On 12/8/2023 11:22 PM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-12-08 at 23:15 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
> > > On 12/7/2023 1:24 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > > > On Wed, 2023-12-06 at 17:22 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
> > > > > On 12/5/2023 6:12 PM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, 2023-12-04 at 16:50 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
> > > > > [...]
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > > vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
> > > > > > > > > @@ -2469,6 +2491,18 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
> > > > > > > > > if (kvm_mpx_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
> > > > > > > > > (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
> > > > > > > > > vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > + if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
> > > > > > > > I don't think that nested.nested_run_pending check is needed.
> > > > > > > > prepare_vmcs02_rare is not going to be called unless the nested run is pending.
> > > > > > > But there're other paths along to call prepare_vmcs02_rare(), e.g., vmx_set_nested_state()-> nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode()-> prepare_vmcs02_rare(), especially when L1 instead of L2 was running. In this case, nested.nested_run_pending == false,
> > > > > > > we don't need to update vmcs02's fields at the point until L2 is being resumed.
> > > > > > - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *not running*, then prepare_vmcs02_rare won't be called,
> > > > > > because nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode will not be called, because in turn there is no nested vmcs to load.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *about to run* (KVM emulated the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH,
> > > > > > but we didn't do the actual hardware VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME on vmcs02, then the 'nested_run_pending' will be true, it will be restored
> > > > > > from the migration stream.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > - If we migrate while nested guest was run once but didn't VMEXIT to L1 yet, then yes, nested.nested_run_pending will be false indeed,
> > > > > > but we still need to setup vmcs02, otherwise it will be left with default zero values.
> > > > > Thanks a lot for recapping these cases! I overlooked some nested flags before. It makes sense to remove nested.nested_run_pending.
> > > > > > Remember that prior to setting nested state the VM wasn't running even once usually, unlike when the guest enters nested state normally.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > + (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
> > > > > > > > > + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, vmcs12->guest_ssp);
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE,
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
> > > > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > > > > + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> > > > > > > > > + guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, vmcs12->guest_s_cet);
> > > > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > > > > }
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
> > > > > > > > > @@ -4300,6 +4334,15 @@ static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > > > > > > > > vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
> > > > > > > > > vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs12->guest_ssp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> > > > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > > > > + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> > > > > > > > > + guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> > > > > > > > > + vmcs12->guest_s_cet = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> > > > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > > > The above code should be conditional on VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE - if the guest (L2) state
> > > > > > > > was loaded, then it must be updated on exit - this is usually how VMX works.
> > > > > > > I think this is not for L2 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, it happens in prepare_vmcs02_rare(). IIUC, the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally when vm-exit happens,
> > > > > > > so these fields for L2 guest should be synced to L1 unconditionally.
> > > > > > "the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally"
> > > > > > This is not true, unless there is a bug.
> > > > > I checked the latest SDM, there's no such kind of wording regarding CET entry/exit control bits. The wording comes from
> > > > > the individual CET spec.:
> > > > > "10.6 VM Exit
> > > > > On processors that support CET, the VM exit saves the state of IA32_S_CET, SSP and IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSR to the VMCS guest-state area unconditionally."
> > > > > But since it doesn't appear in SDM, I shouldn't take it for granted.
> > > > SDM spec from September 2023:
> > > >
> > > > 28.3.1 Saving Control Registers, Debug Registers, and MSRs
> > > >
> > > > "If the processor supports the 1-setting of the “load CET” VM-entry control, the contents of the IA32_S_CET and
> > > > IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSRs are saved into the corresponding fields. On processors that do not
> > > > support Intel 64 architecture, bits 63:32 of these MSRs are not saved."
> > > >
> > > > Honestly it's not 100% clear if the “load CET” should be set to 1 to trigger the restore, or that this control just needs to be
> > > > supported on the CPU.
> > > > It does feel like you are right here, that CPU always saves the guest state, but allows to not load it on VM entry via
> > > > “load CET” VM entry control.
> > > >
> > > > IMHO its best to check what the bare metal does by rigging a test by patching the host kernel to not set the 'load CET' control,
> > > > and see if the CPU still updates the guest CET fields on the VM exit.
> > > OK, I'll do some tests to see what's happening, thanks!
> > > > > > the vmcs12 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE should be passed through as is to vmcs02, so if the nested guest doesn't set this bit
> > > > > > the entry/exit using vmcs02 will not touch the CET state, which is unusual but allowed by the spec I think - a nested hypervisor can opt for example to save/load
> > > > > > this state manually or use msr load/store lists instead.
> > > > > Right although the use case should be rare, will modify the code to check VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE. Thanks!
> > > > > > Regardless of this,
> > > > > > if the guest didn't set VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, then vmcs12 guest fields should neither be loaded on VM entry (copied to vmcs02) nor updated on VM exit,
> > > > > > (that is copied back to vmcs12) this is what is written in the VMX spec.
> > > > > What's the VMX spec. your're referring to here?
> > > > SDM.
> > > >
> > > > In fact, now that I am thinking about this again, it should be OK to unconditionally copy the CET fields from vmcs12 to vmcs02, because as long as the
> > > > VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE is not set, the CPU should care about their values in the vmcs02.
> > I noticed a typo. I meant that the CPU should't care about their values in the vmcs02.
> >
> > > > And about the other way around, assuming that I made a mistake as I said above, then the other way around is indeed unconditional.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Sorry for a bit of a confusion.
> > > NP, I also double check it with HW Arch and get it back.
> > > Thanks for raising these questions!
>
> I got reply from HW Arch, the guest CET state is saved unconditionally:
>
> "On the state save side, uCode doesn’t check for an exit control (or the load CET VM-entry control), but rather since it supports (as of TGL/SPR) CET,
> it unconditionally saves the state to the VMCS guest-state area. "
Great!
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
>
> > Thanks to you too!
> >
> >
> > Best regards,
> > Maxim Levitsky
> >
> > > > Best regards,
> > > > Maxim Levitsky
> > > >
> > > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-12 11:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 7:52 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 1:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01 ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14 3:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 4:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 2:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04 0:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 9:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04 8:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09 ` Maxim Levitsky [this message]
2023-12-15 2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
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