public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Baolu Lu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@intel.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>, Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 16:06:49 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7f739f3b-b2a1-8a81-e134-738bdf2c44eb@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220502143154.444dd1dd@jacob-builder>

On 2022/5/3 05:31, Jacob Pan wrote:
> Hi BaoLu,

Hi Jacob,

> 
> On Sun, 1 May 2022 19:24:32 +0800, Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
> wrote:
> 
>> As domain->force_snooping only impacts the devices attached with the
>> domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same
>> time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), the
>> force_snooping field could be set, but the attach_dev callback will
>> return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no
>> snoop control capability.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h |  2 ++
>>   drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 18 +++++++++++++
>>   3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
>> index ab4408c824a5..583ea67fc783 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
>> @@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu
>> *iommu, bool fault_ignore);
>>   int vcmd_alloc_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, u32 *pasid);
>>   void vcmd_free_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, u32 pasid);
>> +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
>> +					  struct device *dev, u32 pasid);
>>   #endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
>> index 98050943d863..3c1c228f9031 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
>> @@ -4554,13 +4554,61 @@ static phys_addr_t
>> intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, return phys;
>>   }
>>   
>> +static bool domain_support_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
>> +{
>> +	struct device_domain_info *info;
>> +	unsigned long flags;
>> +	bool support = true;
>> +
>> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
>> +	if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link) {
>> +		if (!ecap_sc_support(info->iommu->ecap)) {
>> +			support = false;
>> +			break;
>> +		}
>> +	}
> why not just check the flag dmar_domain->force_snooping? devices wouldn't
> be able to attach if !ecap_sc, right?

I should check "dmar_domain->force_snooping" first. If this is the first
time that this flag is about to set, then check the capabilities.

> 
>> +out:
>> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
>> +	return support;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void domain_set_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
>> +{
>> +	struct device_domain_info *info;
>> +	unsigned long flags;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The
>> +	 * iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!domain_use_first_level(domain))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
>> +	if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
>> +		goto out_unlock;
>> +
>> +	list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link)
>> +		intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(info->iommu,
>> info->dev,
>> +						     PASID_RID2PASID);
>> +
> I guess other DMA API PASIDs need to have sc bit set as well. I will keep
> this in mind for my DMA API PASID patch.

Kernel DMA don't need to set the PGSNP bit. The x86 arch is always DMA
coherent. The force snooping is only needed when the device is
controlled by user space, but the VMM is optimized not to support the
virtualization of the wbinv instruction.

> 
>> +out_unlock:
>> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
>> +}
>> +
>>   static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct iommu_domain
>> *domain) {
>>   	struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
>>   
>> -	if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping(NULL))
>> +	if (!domain_support_force_snooping(dmar_domain))
>>   		return false;
>> +
>> +	domain_set_force_snooping(dmar_domain);
>>   	dmar_domain->force_snooping = true;
>> +
> nit: spurious change

I expect a blank line before return in the end.

>>   	return true;
>>   }
>>   
>> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
>> index f8d215d85695..815c744e6a34 100644
>> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
>> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
>> @@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct
>> intel_iommu *iommu,
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up.
>> + */
>> +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
>> +					  struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
>> +{
>> +	struct pasid_entry *pte;
>> +	u16 did;
>> +
>> +	pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid);
>> +	if (WARN_ON(!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present(pte)))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	pasid_set_pgsnp(pte);
>> +	did = pasid_get_domain_id(pte);
>> +	pasid_flush_caches(iommu, pte, pasid, did);
>> +}
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jacob

Best regards,
baolu

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-04  8:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-01 11:24 [PATCH 0/5] iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement Lu Baolu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 1/5] iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:04   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:05   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04  7:25     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-04 13:31       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 14:37         ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:17   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04  7:58     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-02 21:31   ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04  8:06     ` Baolu Lu [this message]
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-02 21:36   ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04  8:47     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04  8:49     ` Baolu Lu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7f739f3b-b2a1-8a81-e134-738bdf2c44eb@linux.intel.com \
    --to=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=alex.williamson@redhat.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jacob.jun.pan@intel.com \
    --cc=jgg@nvidia.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=yi.l.liu@intel.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox