From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>,
trondmy@kernel.org, anna@kernel.org, bcodding@redhat.com
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
yukuai1@huaweicloud.com, houtao1@huawei.com,
yi.zhang@huawei.com, yangerkun@huawei.com,
lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] nfs: handle failure of get_nfs_open_context
Date: Sat, 19 Apr 2025 08:34:42 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <828b70d9f1c0a34966aeda8198d80046dcd2bba2.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250419085355.1451457-3-lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
On Sat, 2025-04-19 at 16:53 +0800, Li Lingfeng wrote:
> During initialization of unlockdata or lockdata structures, if acquiring
> the nfs_open_context fails, the current operation must be aborted to
> ensure the nfs_open_context remains valid after initialization completes.
> This is critical because both lock and unlock release callbacks
> dereference the nfs_open_context - an invalid context could lead to null
> pointer dereference.
>
> Fixes: faf5f49c2d9c ("NFSv4: Make NFS clean up byte range locks asynchronously")
> Fixes: a5d16a4d090b ("NFSv4: Convert LOCK rpc call into an asynchronous RPC call")
> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
> ---
> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index 9f5689c43a50..d76cf0f79f9c 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -7075,24 +7075,27 @@ static struct nfs4_unlockdata *nfs4_alloc_unlockdata(struct file_lock *fl,
> struct nfs4_state *state = lsp->ls_state;
> struct inode *inode = state->inode;
> struct nfs_lock_context *l_ctx;
> + struct nfs_open_context *open_ctx;
>
> p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (p == NULL)
> return NULL;
> l_ctx = nfs_get_lock_context(ctx);
> - if (!IS_ERR(l_ctx)) {
> + if (!IS_ERR(l_ctx))
> p->l_ctx = l_ctx;
> - } else {
> - kfree(p);
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + else
> + goto out_free;
> + /* Ensure we don't close file until we're done freeing locks! */
> + open_ctx = get_nfs_open_context(ctx);
>
>
Sorry for the confusion. Now that I look more closely, I think I was
wrong before.
This can't fail, because the caller holds a reference to ctx, so the
refcount must be non-zero. Instead of this patch, could you add a
comment in there to that effect to make this clear in the future?
> + if (open_ctx)
> + p->ctx = open_ctx;
> + else
> + goto out_free;
If we did decide to keep the error handling however, this would leak
l_ctx. That reference would also need to be put if open_ctx was NULL
here.
> p->arg.fh = NFS_FH(inode);
> p->arg.fl = &p->fl;
> p->arg.seqid = seqid;
> p->res.seqid = seqid;
> p->lsp = lsp;
> - /* Ensure we don't close file until we're done freeing locks! */
> - p->ctx = get_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> locks_init_lock(&p->fl);
> locks_copy_lock(&p->fl, fl);
> p->server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
> @@ -7100,6 +7103,9 @@ static struct nfs4_unlockdata *nfs4_alloc_unlockdata(struct file_lock *fl,
> nfs4_stateid_copy(&p->arg.stateid, &lsp->ls_stateid);
> spin_unlock(&state->state_lock);
> return p;
> +out_free:
> + kfree(p);
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> static void nfs4_locku_release_calldata(void *data)
> @@ -7327,6 +7333,8 @@ static struct nfs4_lockdata *nfs4_alloc_lockdata(struct file_lock *fl,
> p->lsp = lsp;
> p->server = server;
> p->ctx = get_nfs_open_context(ctx);
> + if (!p->ctx)
> + goto out_free_seqid;
> locks_init_lock(&p->fl);
> locks_copy_lock(&p->fl, fl);
> return p;
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-19 12:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-19 8:53 [PATCH 0/2] nfs: handle failure during allocing lock/unlock data Li Lingfeng
2025-04-19 8:53 ` [PATCH 1/2] nfs: handle failure of nfs_get_lock_context in unlock path Li Lingfeng
2025-04-19 8:53 ` [PATCH 2/2] nfs: handle failure of get_nfs_open_context Li Lingfeng
2025-04-19 12:34 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2025-04-21 1:56 ` Li Lingfeng
2025-04-21 12:00 ` Jeff Layton
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