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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <francescolavra.fl@gmail.com>,
	Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 05:41:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <858qqvwl4w.fsf@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z4gqlbumOFPF_rxd@google.com>

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:

>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> index 0864b314c26a..9baffb425386 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> @@ -663,7 +663,12 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
>  	unsigned int eax_denominator, ebx_numerator, ecx_hz, edx;
>  	unsigned int crystal_khz;
>  
> -	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
> +	/*
> +	 * Ignore the vendor when running as a VM, if the hypervisor provides
> +	 * garbage CPUID information then the vendor is also suspect.
> +	 */
> +	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
> +	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < 0x15)
> @@ -713,10 +718,13 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
> -	 * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
> +	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.  Similarly, in a
> +	 * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
> +	 * watchdog source will be emulated in software.  In both cases, mark
> +	 * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
>  	 */
> -	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
> +	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
>  		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);

One more point here is for AMD guests, TSC will not be marked reliable
as per the above change, it will only be effective for CPUs supporting
CPUID 15H/16H. Although, the watchdog should be stopped for AMD guests
as well.

Will it make sense to move this before cpuid_level check ?

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index e7abcc4d02c3..2769d1598c0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -672,6 +672,14 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * In a VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as
+	 * the watchdog source will be emulated in software. Mark the TSC
+	 * reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
+
 	if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < CPUID_LEAF_TSC)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -719,13 +727,10 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.  Similarly, in a
-	 * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
-	 * watchdog source will be emulated in software.  In both cases, mark
-	 * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
+	 * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC

Regards
Nikunj

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-28  5:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-06 12:46 [PATCH v16 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 01/13] virt: sev-guest: Remove is_vmpck_empty() helper Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 02/13] virt: sev-guest: Replace GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:40   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 03/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 04/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 05/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 10:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 11:43     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-07 12:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 18:53         ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:18           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  7:47             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:05               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  8:37                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:43                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 19:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 06/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 20:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 07/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 08/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 09/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Mark the TSC in a secure TSC guest as reliable tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 10/13] x86/tsc: Switch Secure TSC guests away from kvm-clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 15:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 10:45     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/tsc: Init the TSC for Secure TSC guests tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 11/13] x86/tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating for guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 19:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  5:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  8:34         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 10:20           ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 14:00             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:34               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:02                 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 19:53                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09  6:32                   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-15 21:37                     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-16 16:25                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-16 16:56                         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-17 20:28                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 20:59                             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-21 11:32                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-21  3:59                       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-28  5:41                       ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add the " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania

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