From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <francescolavra.fl@gmail.com>,
Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 05:41:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <858qqvwl4w.fsf@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z4gqlbumOFPF_rxd@google.com>
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> index 0864b314c26a..9baffb425386 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> @@ -663,7 +663,12 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
> unsigned int eax_denominator, ebx_numerator, ecx_hz, edx;
> unsigned int crystal_khz;
>
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
> + /*
> + * Ignore the vendor when running as a VM, if the hypervisor provides
> + * garbage CPUID information then the vendor is also suspect.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
> + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> return 0;
>
> if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < 0x15)
> @@ -713,10 +718,13 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
> return 0;
>
> /*
> - * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
> - * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
> + * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource. Similarly, in a
> + * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
> + * watchdog source will be emulated in software. In both cases, mark
> + * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
> */
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
> + boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
One more point here is for AMD guests, TSC will not be marked reliable
as per the above change, it will only be effective for CPUs supporting
CPUID 15H/16H. Although, the watchdog should be stopped for AMD guests
as well.
Will it make sense to move this before cpuid_level check ?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index e7abcc4d02c3..2769d1598c0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -672,6 +672,14 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
return 0;
+ /*
+ * In a VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as
+ * the watchdog source will be emulated in software. Mark the TSC
+ * reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
+
if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < CPUID_LEAF_TSC)
return 0;
@@ -719,13 +727,10 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
return 0;
/*
- * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource. Similarly, in a
- * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
- * watchdog source will be emulated in software. In both cases, mark
- * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+ * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
+ * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-28 5:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-06 12:46 [PATCH v16 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 01/13] virt: sev-guest: Remove is_vmpck_empty() helper Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 02/13] virt: sev-guest: Replace GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 03/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 04/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 05/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 10:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 11:43 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-07 12:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 7:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 8:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 8:37 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 8:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 19:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 06/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 20:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 07/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 08/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 09/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Mark the TSC in a secure TSC guest as reliable tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 10/13] x86/tsc: Switch Secure TSC guests away from kvm-clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 15:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 10:45 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/tsc: Init the TSC for Secure TSC guests tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 11/13] x86/tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating for guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 17:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 19:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 8:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 8:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 10:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 14:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 19:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09 6:32 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-15 21:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-16 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-16 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-17 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 20:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-21 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-21 3:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-28 5:41 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09 9:43 ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add the " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
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