> > Surely the only logical reason to tag a process with extra security
> > information /in the kernel/ is because that information is going to be
> > used /by the kernel/.  I can't think of a good reason to put a
> > generalised keystore in the kernel.
> 
> Here are three good reasons.
> 
>  - You want the key lifetime to be the same as your process lifetime
>  - You want the key to be readable ONLY by that one process.
>  - The kernel wants to supports multiple security realms and mechanisms.
> Not everybody is happy with just kerberosV credentials, and we already
> have beta code for the SPKM mechanism in RPCSEC_GSS.
> 
> 
> As for the AFS PAG idea: it's already been shot down. See the
> linux-fsdevel thread I referred to earlier.

You might want to look at this patch. It's what I've come up with to support
kafs, but it's general, and should work for anything. It's been built along
Linus's guidelines, and has Linus's approval, contingent on something actually
using it fully.

You can use the session keyring number as a PAG ID if you wish.

I've a sample aklog program (key submission) should you be interested.

David