From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>,
kpsingh@kernel.org, revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org,
ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
kafai@fb.com, songliubraving@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, cgzones@googlemail.com,
karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com, tixxdz@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 14:57:40 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <871qte8wy3.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhSHJNLS-KJ-Rz1R12PQbqACSksLYLbymF78d5hMkSGc-g@mail.gmail.com> (Paul Moore's message of "Wed, 17 Aug 2022 12:01:39 -0400")
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> writes:
> At the end of the v4 patchset I suggested merging this into lsm/next
> so it could get a full -rc cycle in linux-next, assuming no issues
> were uncovered during testing
What in the world can be uncovered in linux-next for code that has no in
tree users.
That is one of my largest problems. I want to talk about the users and
the use cases and I don't get dialog. Nor do I get hey look back there
you missed it.
Since you don't want to rehash this. I will just repeat my conclusion
that the patchset appears to introduce an ineffective defense that will
achieve nothing in the defense of the kernel, and so all it will achieve
a code maintenance burden and to occasionally break legitimate users of
the user namespace.
Further the process is broken. You are changing the semantics of an
operation with the introduction of a security hook. That needs a
man-page and discussion on linux-abi. In general of the scrutiny we
give to new systems and changed system calls. As this change
fundamentally changes the semantics of creating a user namespace.
Skipping that part of the process is not simply disagree that is being
irresponsible.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-17 19:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-15 16:20 [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook Frederick Lawler
2022-08-15 16:20 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-08-16 21:51 ` [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Paul Moore
2022-08-17 15:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 16:01 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 19:57 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-08-17 20:13 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 20:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-17 21:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-17 21:50 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-18 0:35 ` Jonathan Chapman-Moore
2022-08-18 14:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-18 15:11 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-19 14:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-19 21:10 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 18:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-25 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 21:58 ` Song Liu
2022-08-25 22:10 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-25 22:42 ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 15:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-26 16:57 ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 15:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26 17:00 ` Song Liu
2022-08-26 21:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26 22:34 ` Song Liu
2022-08-29 15:33 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-03 3:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-08-26 9:10 ` Ignat Korchagin
2022-08-26 15:12 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-26 15:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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