Re: RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs

[ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)]

Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> writes:

>>> The security implications are that anything that can change the label
>>> could also hide itself and its doings from the audit system and thus
>>> would be used as a means to evade detection.  I actually think this
>>> means the label should be write once (once you've set it, you can't
>>> change it) ...
>>
>> Richard and I have talked about a write once approach, but the
>> thinking was that you may want to allow a nested container
>> orchestrator (Why? I don't know, but people always want to do the
>> craziest things.) and a write-once policy makes that impossible.  If
>> we punt on the nested orchestrator, I believe we can seriously think
>> about a write-once policy to simplify things.
>
> Nested containers are a very widely used use-case (see LXC system containers,
> inside of which people run other container runtimes). So I would definitely
> consider it something that "needs to be supported in some way". While the LXC
> guys might be a *tad* crazy, the use-case isn't. :P

Of course some of that gets to running auditd inside a container which
we don't have yet either.

So I think to start it is perfectly fine to figure out the non-nested
case first and what makes sense there.  Then to sort out the nested
container case.

The solution might be that a process gets at most one id per ``audit
namespace''.

Eric