From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 14:44:58 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8731e234-22b8-4ccf-89ef-63feed09e9c5@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251026201911.505204-8-xin@zytor.com>
On 10/27/2025 4:18 AM, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
>
> Initialize host VMCS FRED fields with host FRED MSRs' value and
> guest VMCS FRED fields to 0.
>
> FRED CPU state is managed in 9 new FRED MSRs:
> IA32_FRED_CONFIG,
> IA32_FRED_STKLVLS,
> IA32_FRED_RSP0,
> IA32_FRED_RSP1,
> IA32_FRED_RSP2,
> IA32_FRED_RSP3,
> IA32_FRED_SSP1,
> IA32_FRED_SSP2,
> IA32_FRED_SSP3,
> as well as a few existing CPU registers and MSRs:
> CR4.FRED,
> IA32_STAR,
> IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE,
> IA32_PL0_SSP (also known as IA32_FRED_SSP0).
>
> CR4, IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE and IA32_STAR are already well managed.
> Except IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_FRED_SSP0, all other FRED CPU state
> MSRs have corresponding VMCS fields in both the host-state and
> guest-state areas. So KVM just needs to initialize them, and with
> proper VM entry/exit FRED controls, a FRED CPU will keep tracking
> host and guest FRED CPU state in VMCS automatically.
>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
One nit below.
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index fcfa99160018..c8b5359123bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -1459,6 +1459,15 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
> (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
> }
>
> + /* Per-CPU FRED MSRs */
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
Nit:
Is this needed?
FRED is initialized by X86_64_F(), if CONFIG_X86_64 is not enabled, this
path is not reachable.
There should be no compilation issue without #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 / #endif.
There are several similar patterns in this patch, using #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /
#endif or not seems not consistent. E.g. __vmx_vcpu_reset() and init_vmcs()
doesn't check the config, but here does.
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, __this_cpu_ist_top_va(ESTACK_DB));
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, __this_cpu_ist_top_va(ESTACK_NMI));
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, __this_cpu_ist_top_va(ESTACK_DF));
> +#endif
> + }
> +
> vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
> }
> }
> @@ -4330,6 +4339,17 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> */
> vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
> vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
> +
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
> + /* FRED CONFIG and STKLVLS are the same on all CPUs */
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, kvm_host.fred_config);
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, kvm_host.fred_stklvls);
> +
> + /* Linux doesn't support kernel shadow stacks, thus SSPs are 0s */
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, 0);
> + }
> #else
> vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
> vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
> @@ -4841,6 +4861,17 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> }
>
> vmx_setup_uret_msrs(vmx);
> +
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, 0);
> + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, 0);
> + }
> }
>
> static void __vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> @@ -8717,6 +8748,11 @@ __init int vmx_hardware_setup(void)
>
> kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
>
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, kvm_host.fred_config);
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, kvm_host.fred_stklvls);
> + }
> +
> return r;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index f3dc77f006f9..0c1fbf75442b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct kvm_host_values {
> u64 xss;
> u64 s_cet;
> u64 arch_capabilities;
> +
> + u64 fred_config;
> + u64 fred_stklvls;
> };
>
> void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-21 6:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20 9:24 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49 ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28 2:31 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35 ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07 7:38 ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 2:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 6:44 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2026-01-21 18:14 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 0:45 ` Xin Li
2026-01-22 1:56 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:27 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:49 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 5:56 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 2:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17 0:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 5:59 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01 6:20 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 6:19 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21 8:05 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 3:24 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12 ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50 ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:54 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07 2:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07 3:05 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 6:13 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:26 ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05 0:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 7:20 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09 ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46 ` Xin Li
2026-03-06 5:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19 7:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 7:30 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:56 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 8:07 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:09 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 9:46 ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58 ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:32 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 6:30 ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07 ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 0:44 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52 ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:00 ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20 9:19 ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 2:33 ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02 6:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13 3:20 ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08 ` Xin Li
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