From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
jmill@asu.edu, joao@overdrivepizza.com, kees@kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
luto@kernel.org, samitolvanen@google.com,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 13:13:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8734fyqncg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1cf8d5a5-bf3e-4667-bc6a-d1b1d662d822@citrix.com> (Andrew Cooper's message of "Thu, 13 Feb 2025 02:42:10 +0000")
* Andrew Cooper:
> The SYSCALL behaviour TLDR is:
>
> %rcx = %rip
> %r11 = %eflags
> %cs = fixed attr
> %ss = fixed attr
> %rip = MSR_LSTAR
>
> which means that %rcx (old rip) is the only piece of state which
> userspace can't feasibly forge (and therefore could distinguish a
> SYSCALL from user vs kernel mode), yet if we're talking about a JOP
> chain to get here, then %rcx is under attacker control too.
Will the syscall handler do anything useful if called with an invalid
system call number?
If not, and if you can changed the FineIBT cookie register to %rax,
would that address this particular gap? As long as the cookies do not
overlap with valid system call numbers?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-28 12:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <Z60NwR4w/28Z7XUa@ubun>
2025-02-12 22:29 ` [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints Jann Horn
2025-02-13 1:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13 2:09 ` Jann Horn
2025-02-13 2:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-22 20:43 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-25 18:10 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-25 20:06 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-25 21:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-26 2:55 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-26 22:48 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-02-27 0:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-03-01 22:48 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-03-02 19:16 ` Rudolf Marek
2025-03-02 22:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-28 12:13 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2025-02-13 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13 20:53 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-13 20:57 ` Jann Horn
2025-02-16 23:42 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-14 9:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-15 21:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-16 23:51 ` Kees Cook
2025-02-17 10:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-17 13:06 ` David Laight
2025-02-17 13:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-17 18:38 ` David Laight
2025-02-17 18:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-14 10:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-14 9:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-02-13 6:15 ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-13 19:23 ` Jann Horn
2025-02-13 21:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-13 23:24 ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-13 23:43 ` Jann Horn
2025-02-14 23:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-15 0:07 ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-15 0:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-02-15 0:19 ` Jennifer Miller
2025-02-14 22:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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