From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
To: "André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
"Uros Bizjak" <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>
Subject: Re: [patch v2 00/11] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2026 11:08:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <875x6hd1px.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d51aec74-64ee-419f-a880-b9c41e7f1c95@igalia.com>
On Fri, Mar 27 2026 at 00:42, André Almeida wrote:
> Em 26/03/2026 19:08, Rich Felker escreveu:
>> On Thu, Mar 26, 2026 at 10:59:20PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>> On Fri, Mar 20 2026 at 00:24, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>>> If the functionality itself is agreed on we only need to agree on the names
>>>> and signatures of the functions exposed through the VDSO before we set them
>>>> in stone. That will hopefully not take another 15 years :)
>>>
>>> Have the libc folks any further opinion on the syscall and the vDSO part
>>> before I prepare v3?
>>
>> This whole conversation has been way too much for me to keep up with,
>> so I'm not sure where it's at right now.
>>
>> From musl's perspective, the way we make robust mutex unlocking safe
>> right now is by inhibiting munmap/mremap/MAP_FIXED and
>> pthread_mutex_destroy while there are any in-flight robust unlocks. It
>> will be nice to be able to conditionally stop doing that if vdso is
>> available, but I can't see using a fallback that requires a syscall,
>> as that would just be a lot more expensive than what we're doing right
>> now and still not work on older kernels. So I think the only part
>> we're interested in is the fully-userspace approach in vdso.
>>
>
> You just need the syscall for the contented case (where you would need a
> syscall anyway for a FUTEX_WAKE).
>
> As Thomas wrote in patch 09/11:
>
> The resulting code sequence for user space is:
>
> if (__vdso_futex_robust_list$SZ_try_unlock(lock, tid, &pending_op) !=
> tid)
> err = sys_futex($OP | FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK,....);
>
> Both the VDSO unlock and the kernel side unlock ensure that the
> pending_op pointer is always cleared when the lock becomes unlocked.
>
>
> So you call the vDSO first. If it fails, it means that the lock is
> contented and you need to call futex(). It will wake a waiter, release
> the lock and clean list_op_pending.
See also the V1 cover letter which has a full deep dive:
https://lore.kernel.org/20260316162316.356674433@kernel.org
TLDR:
The problem can be split into two issues:
1) Contended unlock
2) Uncontended unlock
#1 is solved by moving the unlock into the kernel instead of unlocking
first and then invoking the syscall to wake waiters. The syscall
takes the list_pending_op pointer as an argument and after unlocking,
i.e. *lock = 0, it clears the list_pending_op pointer
For this to work, it needs to use try_cmpxchg() like PI unlock does.
#2 The race is between the succesful try_cmpxchg() and the clearing of
the list_pending_op pointer
That's where the VDSO comes into play. Instead of having the
try_cmpxchg() in the library code the library invokes the VDSO
provided variant. That allows the kernel to check in the signal
delivery path whether a successful unlock requires a helping hand to
clear the list pending op pointer. If the interrupted IP is in the
critical section _and_ the try_cmpxchg() succeeded then the kernel
clears the pointer.
In x86 ASM:
0000000000001590 <__vdso_futex_robust_list64_try_unlock@@LINUX_2.6>:
1590: mov %esi,%eax
1592: xor %ecx,%ecx
1594: lock cmpxchg %ecx,(%rdi) // Result goes into ZF
1598: jne 159d <- CS start
159a: mov %rcx,(%rdx) // Clear list_pending_op
159d: ret <- CS end
159e: xchg %ax,%ax
So if the kernel observes
IP >= CS start && IP < CS end
then it checks the ZF flag in pt_regs and if set it clears the
list_pending op.
Obviously #1 depends on #2 to close all holes.
Thanks,
tglx
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-27 10:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-19 23:24 [patch v2 00/11] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 01/11] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 14:59 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 02/11] futex: Move futex related mm_struct " Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 15:00 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 03/11] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 15:01 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 04/11] uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 9:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-20 12:38 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 16:07 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 05/11] x86: Select ARCH_STORE_IMPLIES_RELEASE Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 16:08 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 06/11] futex: Cleanup UAPI defines Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 16:09 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 07/11] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 17:14 ` André Almeida
2026-03-26 22:23 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-27 0:48 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 08/11] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 9:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-20 12:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 09/11] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 13:35 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 23:24 ` [patch v2 10/11] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 23:25 ` [patch v2 11/11] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-20 7:14 ` Uros Bizjak
2026-03-20 12:48 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-26 21:59 ` [patch v2 00/11] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-26 22:08 ` Rich Felker
2026-03-27 3:42 ` André Almeida
2026-03-27 10:08 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
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