From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CF7831D016B for ; Wed, 2 Oct 2024 13:43:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1727876596; cv=none; b=HbPX27zN4QH3zBUjDLfvFH5BPYPZsUXnVc1VuG/X3CQie8BWgwdmfEJY8K1Siu13FyuIYO7RfKXStjFcznsNckyTAn7hGfASu6WLrvlwMdlpWglnC751UAMzoFTT2thOSp63HcWxK+0sxpIzGn7Cm0EwSIRmKk50YZa25Pe6w0s= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1727876596; c=relaxed/simple; bh=lKdaPrbDxYYptUY20vGcv5cxoNG1fG/jWI1EqVTMdt4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:Message-ID: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=SursFDCWFlsMOLQLezItqvYuManW8kApXShrcRQkiOaPteU5K+pTQ1+Hu/mZsLBftkUEGfenzuQcvMYOd9m9OzDO//kY77ZlB/vHCnxRBmtHCIrKhoYONUCGDBqL28YCgaX0MaV/Rt2GpZW3ZbVqhE1jH90FMZzdN9UffjnohhM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=YJ4PCkKN; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=0GgIhnxg; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="YJ4PCkKN"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="0GgIhnxg" From: Thomas Gleixner DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1727876593; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=whXTKWEOMAgeGAS9876qMUwkTE6aY26TEx5jZc2uCyE=; b=YJ4PCkKNbfvfP2++jy8vdMs6by125YjjILEaRFd0RVq5Rj2wFwx7jueEMoUVCQjcedtjfK NvkNgyvx5k6WBj3OJj8A3iVMpBe/UR4J6UWP0v5EHpK8jzEEBUyPzAc73b9jnTtpHaIPFx lAOO7hJZjACwkJVb3cQxr3UFtIq9x7ccz0S+RrgrIL+siOz6O9aQgfAwbwMu+ZucMvalh4 6qWXSKzPv4mx9QCfHU2sbrtwljRprU4kUAcFfMrFBLkK4GlF6M81jNoTaYPMjsD7HOwxKT cKHZmRqGIPYdPGqmUaW2OqWzS8yvbE7XXcuN1oLJybMZoxjmfsx2lTH3J9DT5Q== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1727876593; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=whXTKWEOMAgeGAS9876qMUwkTE6aY26TEx5jZc2uCyE=; b=0GgIhnxgfhcfTcN3aKWtZQE8UdWJyzvGgrZPc3volSOmQZhmKypRfEHSpO3kJ+buVx1NAq liAGqYl0L5MCoBCw== To: Michael Kelley , Steven Price , Marc Zyngier Cc: "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Will Deacon , Suzuki K Poulose Subject: RE: [PATCH 1/2] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Share ITS tables with a non-trusted hypervisor In-Reply-To: References: <20240905091738.28544-1-steven.price@arm.com> <20240905091738.28544-2-steven.price@arm.com> Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2024 15:43:13 +0200 Message-ID: <875xqay61a.ffs@tglx> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain On Mon, Sep 09 2024 at 03:47, Michael Kelley wrote: >> + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), >> + 1 << order); >> + if (WARN_ON(ret)) > > On the x86 side, the WARN is done in the implementation of > set_memory_decrypted()/encrypted() so that each call site doesn't > need to do the WARN. Each call site must only leak the memory > if the return value indicates other than success. There are call sites > in architecture neutral code (such as for swiotlb and DMA direct) > that expect the WARN is in set_memory_decrypted()/encrypted(). > To recap a previous discussion, we want the WARN for notification, > but also so the most security-conscious users can set > kernel.panic_on_warn=1 to stop further processing if there are > problems in the decryption/encryption operation. What's the resolution of this? Thanks, tglx