From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD998C4332F for ; Mon, 3 Jan 2022 22:57:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230405AbiACW5O (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Jan 2022 17:57:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41722 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230361AbiACW5N (ORCPT ); Mon, 3 Jan 2022 17:57:13 -0500 Received: from ms.lwn.net (ms.lwn.net [IPv6:2600:3c01:e000:3a1::42]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 48985C061761; Mon, 3 Jan 2022 14:57:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (unknown [IPv6:2601:281:8300:104d::5f6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ms.lwn.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CC8CE4A8; Mon, 3 Jan 2022 22:57:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 ms.lwn.net CC8CE4A8 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lwn.net; s=20201203; t=1641250632; bh=EZSdjmbwoUZbkpeAbnWluDvQjX1mE6MaV2rTZoNqJKo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:Date:From; b=JIXjJsh4dDNZpukgwDev4HDO+SPs7iX0DV6uVCCscpmIs5BXAL4N3V0DJYviHhpso CgtUCnoTt1gacDvexUJDpKSUn+gpYkejyJXzkFa48TOMqByAkxEWG5LdM9hXWwb3JB TVvHfijE30UGVO3cfFO10ABCNsQhVBJSlsC2cMYQaJyMYSepEjzIdK4jbRN+2+GuTx 6Isq7gwfbB0MqTsjeg/9IcdpQjpEVsd1rS6WH0iQ2NTtZ/S7NJ8aYBLIM9JfWvVwLb trSy7EE1M3O/ncIuTHjThM1NGqkp8CD4hkwb/UKR4P9ReQWo910KIyg/sPMVatrvTm DS7qoBGUX9Hwg== From: Jonathan Corbet To: Lukas Bulwahn , Andi Kleen , Randy Dunlap , Thomas Gleixner , Tim Chen , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Lukas Bulwahn Subject: Re: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization In-Reply-To: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> References: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2022 15:57:15 -0700 Message-ID: <875yr0xwac.fsf@meer.lwn.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Lukas Bulwahn writes: > The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to > refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space > randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two > four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also > point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within > the same sentence. > > Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to > the config that provides that. > > Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre") > Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst > index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst > @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2 > before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits > using the firmware. > > - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y > + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y > and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes > attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. Makes sense to me...applied, thanks. jon