From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, criu@openvz.org,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [CRIU] [PATCH 1/3] prctl: reduce permissions to change boundaries of data, brk and stack
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 11:16:41 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8761ohqzc6.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140214180129.GK13358@moon> (Cyrill Gorcunov's message of "Fri, 14 Feb 2014 22:01:29 +0400")
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> writes:
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 09:43:14PM +0400, Andrew Vagin wrote:
>> > My brain hurts just looking at this patch and how you are justifying it.
>> >
>> > For the resources you are mucking with below all you have to do is to
>> > verify that you are below the appropriate rlimit at all times and no
>> > CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check is needed. You only need CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
>> > to exceed your per process limits.
>> >
>> > All you have to do is to fix the current code to properly enforce the
>> > limits.
>>
>> I'm afraid what you are suggesting doesn't work.
>>
>> The first reason is that we can not change both boundaries in one call.
>> But when we are restoring these attributes, we may need to move their
>> too far.
>
> When this code was introduced, there were no user-namespace implementation,
> if I remember correctly, so CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was enough barrier point
> to prevent modifying this values by anyone. Now user-ns brings a limit --
> we need somehow to provide a way to modify these mm fields having no
> CAP_SYS_RESOURCE set. "Verifying rlimit" not an option here because
> we're modifying members one by one (looking back I think this was not
> a good idea to modify the fields in this manner).
>
> Maybe we could improve this api and provide argument as a pointer
> to a structure, which would have all the fields we're going to
> modify, which in turn would allow us to verify that all new values
> are sane and fit rlimits, then we could (probably) deprecate old
> api if noone except c/r camp is using it (I actually can't imagine
> who else might need this api). Then CAP_SYS_RESOURCE requirement
> could be ripped off. Hm? (sure touching api is always "no-no"
> case, but maybe...)
Hmm. Let me rewind this a little bit.
I want to be very stupid and ask the following.
Why can't you have the process of interest do:
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACHME);
execve(executable, args, ...);
/* Have the ptracer inject the recovery/fixup code */
/* Fix up the mostly correct process to look like it has been
* executing for a while.
*/
That should work, set all of the interesting fields, and works as
non-root today. My gut feel says do that and we can just
deprecate/remove prctl_set_mm.
I am hoping we can move this conversation what makes sense from oh ick
checkpoint/restort does not work with user namespaces.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-02-14 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-14 14:13 [PATCH RFC 0/3] c/r: add ability to restore mm attributes in a non-root userns Andrey Vagin
2014-02-14 14:13 ` [PATCH 1/3] prctl: reduce permissions to change boundaries of data, brk and stack Andrey Vagin
2014-02-14 16:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-02-14 17:43 ` Andrew Vagin
2014-02-14 18:01 ` [CRIU] " Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-02-14 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2014-02-14 19:47 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-02-14 20:06 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-02-14 20:18 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-02-15 6:29 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-02-15 23:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-02-14 20:09 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-02-17 8:34 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-02-17 8:52 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-02-17 16:57 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-07 13:51 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-02-14 20:44 ` Andrey Wagin
2014-02-15 23:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-02-14 14:13 ` [PATCH 2/3] capabilities: add a secure bit to allow changing a task exe link Andrey Vagin
2014-02-18 4:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2014-02-14 14:13 ` [PATCH 3/3] prctl: allow to use PR_MM_SET_* which affect only a current task Andrey Vagin
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