From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: nVMX: Invert 'unsupported by eVMCSv1' check
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 13:14:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87a65htt6m.fsf@ovpn-194-52.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y1nAThjeMlMFFrAi@google.com>
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>> When a new feature gets implemented in KVM, EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* defines
>> need to be adjusted to avoid the situation when the feature is exposed
>> to the guest but there's no corresponding eVMCS field[s] for it. This
>> is not obvious and fragile.
>
> Eh, either way is fragile, the only difference is what goes wrong when it breaks.
>
> At the risk of making this overly verbose, what about requiring developers to
> explicitly define whether or not a new control is support? E.g. keep the
> EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* and then add compile-time assertions to verify that every
> feature that is REQUIRED | OPTIONAL is SUPPORTED | UNSUPPORTED.
>
> That way the eVMCS "supported" controls don't need to include the ALWAYSON
> controls, and anytime someone adds a new control, they'll have to stop and think
> about eVMCS.
Is this a good thing or a bad one? :-) I'm not against being extra
verbose but adding a new feature to EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_* (even when there
is a corresponding field) requires testing or a
evmcs_has_perf_global_ctrl()-like story may happen and such testing
would require access to Windows/Hyper-V images. This sounds like an
extra burden for contributors. IMO it's OK if new features are
mechanically added to EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* on the grounds that it
wasn't tested but then it's not much different from "unsupported by
default" (my approach). So I'm on the fence here.
>
> I think we'll still want (need?) the runtime sanitization, but this might allow
> catching at least some cases without needing to wait until a control actually gets
> exposed.
>
> E.g. possibly with more macro magic to reduce the boilerplate
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
> index d8b23c96d627..190932edcc02 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
> @@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ void nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 *
> u32 ctl_high = (u32)(*pdata >> 32);
> u32 unsupported_ctrls;
>
> + BUILD_BUG_ON((EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_PINCTRL | EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL) !=
> + (KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL |
> + KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL));
> +
> /*
> * Hyper-V 2016 and 2019 try using these features even when eVMCS
> * is enabled but there are no corresponding fields.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
> index 6f746ef3c038..58d77afe9d57 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
> @@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(enable_evmcs);
> */
> #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL (PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR | \
> PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
> +#define EVMCS1_SUPPORTED_PINCTRL \
> + (PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | \
> + PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING | \
> + PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
> +
> #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_EXEC_CTRL (CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
> #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC \
> (SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | \
>
--
Vitaly
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-27 11:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-18 10:09 [PATCH 0/4] KVM: VMX: nVMX: Make eVMCS enablement more robust Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-10-18 10:09 ` [PATCH 1/4] KVM: nVMX: Sanitize primary processor-based VM-execution controls with eVMCS too Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-10-18 10:09 ` [PATCH 2/4] KVM: nVMX: Invert 'unsupported by eVMCSv1' check Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-10-26 23:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-27 11:14 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2022-10-27 21:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-18 10:09 ` [PATCH 3/4] KVM: nVMX: Prepare to sanitize tertiary execution controls with eVMCS Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-10-18 10:10 ` [PATCH 4/4] KVM: VMX: Resurrect vmcs_conf sanitization for KVM-on-Hyper-V Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-10-26 23:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2022-10-27 11:26 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
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