From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751653AbeFDEUJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Jun 2018 00:20:09 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:59517 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750853AbeFDEUH (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Jun 2018 00:20:07 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Linux Containers , , , Seth Forshee , Miklos Szeredi , Miklos Szeredi References: <878t7vp64i.fsf@xmission.com> Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2018 23:19:59 -0500 In-Reply-To: <878t7vp64i.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Sun, 03 Jun 2018 22:45:01 -0500") Message-ID: <87bmcrmbdc.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1fPgyT-0002zM-Uq;;;mid=<87bmcrmbdc.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=97.119.124.205;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/nvcxAJWG4CntXspZ0wX/NXrFNkrDjIQA= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 97.119.124.205 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 1.0 XMSubMetaSx_00 1+ Sexy Words * 1.2 XMSubMetaSxObfu_03 Obfuscated Sexy Noun-People * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **;Linus Torvalds X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 194 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.03 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.5 (1.3%), b_tie_ro: 1.80 (0.9%), parse: 0.82 (0.4%), extract_message_metadata: 2.9 (1.5%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.36 (0.7%), tests_pri_-1000: 3.6 (1.8%), tests_pri_-950: 1.18 (0.6%), tests_pri_-900: 1.03 (0.5%), tests_pri_-400: 19 (9.9%), check_bayes: 18 (9.4%), b_tokenize: 6 (3.1%), b_tok_get_all: 6 (3.1%), b_comp_prob: 1.87 (1.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.6 (1.3%), b_finish: 0.57 (0.3%), tests_pri_0: 151 (78.1%), check_dkim_signature: 0.46 (0.2%), check_dkim_adsp: 2.6 (1.3%), tests_pri_500: 4.1 (2.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: [GIT PULL] userns vfs bits for v4.18-rc1 X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Linus, Please pull the userns-linus branch from the git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git userns-linus HEAD: f3f1a18330ac1b717cd7a32adff38d965f365aa2 fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Apologies for the resend I forgot the diffstat and the subject line. This is the last couple of vfs bits to enable root in a user namespace to mount and manipulate a filesystem with backing store (AKA not a virtual filesystem like proc, but a filesystem where the unprivileged user controls the content). The target filesystem for this work is fuse, and Miklos should be sending you the pull request for the fuse bits this merge window. The two key patches are " evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts" and "vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid". Those close small gaps in the vfs that would be a problem if an unprivileged fuse filesystem is mounted. The rest of the changes are things that are now safe to allow a root user in a user namespace to do with a filesystem they have mounted. The most interesting development is that remount is now safe. Eric W. Biederman (5): vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems. fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee (2): evm: Don't update hmacs in user ns mounts fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems fs/attr.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/ioctl.c | 4 ++-- fs/namei.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- fs/namespace.c | 4 ++-- security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) Eric