From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
To: "André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
"Uros Bizjak" <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>,
kernel-dev@igalia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/14] selftests: futex: Add tests for robust unlock within the critical section.
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 23:27:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87cxyd9aa5.ffs@fw13> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a11c5dbf-48d9-4014-8daf-b8afbdec32d4@igalia.com>
On Wed, May 27 2026 at 23:55, André Almeida wrote:
> Em 04/04/2026 06:39, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior escreveu:
>> +
>> + } else if (state == STATE_IN_CS) {
>> + /*
>> + * If the critical section has been entered then
>> + * the kernel has to unlock and clean list_op_pending.
>> + * On 32bit the pointer is just 32bit wide, the
>> + * upper 32bit are cleaned on 64bit.
>> + */
>> + if (is_32bit)
>> + rhead_val &= 0xffffffff;
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(rhead_val, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(lock_val, 0);
>> + }
>
> It turns out that the test success I saw with my aarch64 implementation
> was a false positive :/ There's no logic to verify if the code really
> enters the critical section. If the code just jump over it, the test
> never checks if lock_val and rhead_val are actually zeroed.
>
>> +
>> + if (ptrace(PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, child, 0, 0))
>> + err(1, "PTRACE_SINGLESTEP");
>
> After I fixed my code, the selftest got to an infinity loop (maybe we
> should add max steps?). The single steps doesn't work for LL/SC locks,
> like this one:
>
> retry:
> ldxr %w[val], %[lock]
> cmp %w[tid], %w[val]
> bne end
> stlxr %w[result], wzr, %[lock]
> cbnz %w[result], retry
> end:
>
>
> The single step with ptrace() causes a context switch that clear the
> exclusive monitor[1], so store fails and the code branches to retry. We
> need to jump straight to `cbnz %w[result], retry`. I tested to single
> step with GDB, and it turns outs that it is smart enough to run the code
> from ldxr to stlxr "atomically", to avoid messing with the exclusive
> monitor and then it worked as expected.
That's why I put the labels into the ASM so that the test can set
breakpoints at the proper points and check whether the kernel/vdso did
the right thing. Single stepping is not really a good idea because you
can't test the interruption points, which matter correctly.
Thanks,
tglx
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-29 21:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-02 15:21 [patch V4 00/14] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 01/14] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 02/14] futex: Make futex_mm_init() void Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 03/14] futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-09 11:11 ` Nam Cao
2026-04-10 14:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 04/14] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 05/14] uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user() Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 06/14] x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 07/14] futex: Cleanup UAPI defines Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 08/14] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 09/14] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-28 1:02 ` André Almeida
2026-05-29 21:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 10/14] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-28 1:08 ` André Almeida
2026-05-29 21:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:21 ` [patch V4 11/14] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-28 1:14 ` André Almeida
2026-04-02 15:22 ` [patch V4 12/14] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-29 8:44 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-05-07 9:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-07 9:48 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-05-07 16:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-29 15:36 ` André Almeida
2026-04-02 15:22 ` [patch V4 13/14] Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-02 15:22 ` [patch V4 14/14] selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations Thomas Gleixner
2026-04-04 9:39 ` [PATCH 15/14] selftests: futex: Add tests for robust unlock within the critical section Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-04-04 20:13 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-05-22 22:16 ` André Almeida
2026-05-28 2:55 ` André Almeida
2026-05-29 21:27 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
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