From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15980C433EF for ; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240999AbiBYN2W (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 08:28:22 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45432 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241388AbiBYN2M (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 08:28:12 -0500 Received: from smtp-out2.suse.de (smtp-out2.suse.de [195.135.220.29]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 24DA7197B41; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 05:27:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de [192.168.254.74]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-521) server-digest SHA512) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-out2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D90FA1F380; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1645795658; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=RgVpo4RGRckA/dOLxsNh0O2hyt7uxbE8iG6LJYGdpdQ=; b=FAtD2LOBb7XXvbU4XZ8w05Wd1e6Wu5z0/X9jpXtq+Nk5MLhP5EOVlyfZ/nwtVUr4+CPV6T 39iRaSg4YAOCgD2xOKa9buoq6Fh2vNNEY4NLcD3hYE50QTcazcSh+LAzAtaa2Ni8v54KgX aRLFFXCPDaoTf6WVi87SQg3EbN46F0Q= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1645795658; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=RgVpo4RGRckA/dOLxsNh0O2hyt7uxbE8iG6LJYGdpdQ=; b=+o7T8mRd74XkAFDOBi32aem2Nv3z3f1JgOnGuINVhcirJZ5xhGEirlUQJEm6QeXidTTbDZ M1+h08mfd/PQowDw== Received: from imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de [192.168.254.74]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-521) server-digest SHA512) (No client certificate requested) by imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 804D413BD1; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dovecot-director2.suse.de ([192.168.254.65]) by imap2.suse-dmz.suse.de with ESMTPSA id L6IUHErZGGJgSgAAMHmgww (envelope-from ); Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:38 +0000 Received: from localhost (brahms.olymp [local]) by brahms.olymp (OpenSMTPD) with ESMTPA id 6869ee24; Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:52 +0000 (UTC) From: =?utf-8?Q?Lu=C3=ADs_Henriques?= To: Xiubo Li Cc: Jeff Layton , Ilya Dryomov , ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names References: <20220224112142.18052-1-lhenriques@suse.de> <7d2a798d-ce32-4bf7-b184-267bb79f44e3@redhat.com> <87h78ni8ed.fsf@brahms.olymp> <1945dae6-9c0d-4cf7-49d8-843ba15e1710@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 13:27:52 +0000 In-Reply-To: <1945dae6-9c0d-4cf7-49d8-843ba15e1710@redhat.com> (Xiubo Li's message of "Fri, 25 Feb 2022 18:42:40 +0800") Message-ID: <87czjbhy93.fsf@brahms.olymp> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Xiubo Li writes: > On 2/25/22 5:48 PM, Lu=C3=ADs Henriques wrote: >> Xiubo Li writes: >> >>> On 2/24/22 7:21 PM, Lu=C3=ADs Henriques wrote: >>>> Since filenames in encrypted directories are already encrypted and sho= wn >>>> as a base64-encoded string when the directory is locked, snapshot names >>>> should show a similar behaviour. >>>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Lu=C3=ADs Henriques >>>> --- >>>> fs/ceph/dir.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ >>>> fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 +++++++++- >>>> 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>>> >>>> Support on the MDS for names that'll be > MAX_NAME when base64 encoded= is >>>> still TBD. I thought it would be something easy to do, but snapshots >>>> don't seem to make use of the CDir/CDentry (which is where alternate_n= ame >>>> is stored on the MDS). I'm still looking into this, but I may need so= me >>>> help there :-( >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> -- >>>> Lu=C3=ADs >>>> >>>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c >>>> index a449f4a07c07..20ae600ee7cd 100644 >>>> --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c >>>> +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c >>>> @@ -1065,6 +1065,13 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mn= t_userns, struct inode *dir, >>>> op =3D CEPH_MDS_OP_MKSNAP; >>>> dout("mksnap dir %p snap '%pd' dn %p\n", dir, >>>> dentry, dentry); >>>> + /* XXX missing support for alternate_name in snapshots */ >>>> + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) && (dentry->d_name.len >=3D 189)) { >>>> + dout("encrypted snapshot name too long: %pd len: %d\n", >>>> + dentry, dentry->d_name.len); >>>> + err =3D -ENAMETOOLONG; >>>> + goto out; >>>> + } >>>> } else if (ceph_snap(dir) =3D=3D CEPH_NOSNAP) { >>>> dout("mkdir dir %p dn %p mode 0%ho\n", dir, dentry, mode); >>>> op =3D CEPH_MDS_OP_MKDIR; >>>> @@ -1109,6 +1116,14 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mn= t_userns, struct inode *dir, >>>> !req->r_reply_info.head->is_target && >>>> !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) >>>> err =3D ceph_handle_notrace_create(dir, dentry); >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * If we have created a snapshot we need to clear the cache, otherwi= se >>>> + * snapshot will show encrypted filenames in readdir. >>>> + */ >>> Do you mean dencrypted filenames ? >> What I see without this d_drop() is that, if I run an 'ls' in a snapshot >> directory immediately after creating it, the filenames in that snapshot >> will be encrypted. Maybe there's a bug somewhere else and this d_drop() >> isn't the right fix...? > > Maybe should fix this in ceph_fill_trace() in Hmm... maybe, I'll have to check. Thank's for the suggestion. I'll try to investigate this before sending a new revision which, hopefully, will have some MDS-side changes to support the altname (which I'm still trying to untangle). Cheers, --=20 Lu=C3=ADs > > =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0 } else if ((req->r_op =3D=3D CEPH_MDS_OP_= LOOKUPSNAP ||... { > > =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 } > > ? > > I still haven't gotten where will encrypt it yet in mksnap case. Because = the MDS > will set the 'rinfo->head->is_target' but won't set the > 'rinfo->head->is_dentry', so in this case the dentry should keep the=20 > human readable name. > > - Xiubo > > >> Cheers, >