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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list\:FILESYSTEMS \(VFS and infrastructure\)" 
	<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys
Date: Sun, 03 Nov 2019 12:50:55 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87d0e8g5f4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74a91362-247c-c749-5200-7bdce704ed9e@gmail.com> (Topi Miettinen's message of "Sun, 3 Nov 2019 16:55:48 +0200")

Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes:

> Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged
> tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only
> to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow.

This looks quite buggy.  You neither update table->mode nor
do you ever read from table->mode to initialize the inode.
I am missing something in my quick reading of your patch?

The not updating table->mode almost certainly means that as soon as the
cached inode is invalidated the mode changes will disappear.  Not to
mention they will fail to propogate between  different instances of
proc.

Loosing all of your changes at cache invalidation seems to make this a
useless feature.

Eric


> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> index d80989b6c344..88c4ca7d2782 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> @@ -818,6 +818,10 @@ static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int
> mask)
>         if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
>                 return -EACCES;
>
> +       error = generic_permission(inode, mask);
> +       if (error)
> +               return error;
> +
>         head = grab_header(inode);
>         if (IS_ERR(head))
>                 return PTR_ERR(head);
> @@ -837,9 +841,35 @@ static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct
> iattr *attr)
>         struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
>         int error;
>
> -       if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
> +       if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
>                 return -EPERM;
>
> +       if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
> +               struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode);
> +               struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry;
> +               umode_t max_mode = 0777; /* Only these bits may change */
> +
> +               if (IS_ERR(head))
> +                       return PTR_ERR(head);
> +
> +               if (!table) /* global root - r-xr-xr-x */
> +                       max_mode &= ~0222;
> +               else /*
> +                     * Don't allow permissions to become less
> +                     * restrictive than the sysctl table entry
> +                     */
> +                       max_mode &= table->mode;
> +
> +               sysctl_head_finish(head);
> +
> +               /* Execute bits only allowed for directories */
> +               if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
> +                       max_mode &= ~0111;
> +
> +               if (attr->ia_mode & ~S_IFMT & ~max_mode)
> +                       return -EPERM;
> +       }
> +
>         error = setattr_prepare(dentry, attr);
>         if (error)
>                 return error;
> @@ -853,17 +883,8 @@ static int proc_sys_getattr(const struct path *path, struct
> kstat *stat,
>                             u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
>  {
>         struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
> -       struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode);
> -       struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry;
> -
> -       if (IS_ERR(head))
> -               return PTR_ERR(head);
>
>         generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
> -       if (table)
> -               stat->mode = (stat->mode & S_IFMT) | table->mode;
> -
> -       sysctl_head_finish(head);
>         return 0;
>  }

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-11-03 18:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-03 14:55 [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys Topi Miettinen
2019-11-03 17:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-11-03 19:24   ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-12 23:15   ` Kees Cook
2019-11-03 18:50 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2019-11-03 19:38   ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-04 15:44     ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-04 17:58       ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-04 23:41         ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-11-05  7:35           ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-12 23:19             ` Kees Cook
2019-11-13  1:04               ` Luis Chamberlain
2019-11-12 23:22 ` Christian Brauner
2019-11-13  4:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-11-13 10:52     ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-13 16:00   ` Jann Horn
2019-11-13 16:19     ` Topi Miettinen
2019-11-13 16:40       ` Jann Horn

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