From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9370CC31E44 for ; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 20:47:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7885520896 for ; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 20:23:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2406514AbfFKUXy (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jun 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:42393 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2406489AbfFKUXy (ORCPT ); Tue, 11 Jun 2019 16:23:54 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out03.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1hanJA-0007e5-Hf; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 14:23:52 -0600 Received: from ip72-206-97-68.om.om.cox.net ([72.206.97.68] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1hanJ0-0004Mt-F4; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 14:23:52 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Eric Biggers , Andrei Vagin Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 15:23:27 -0500 Message-ID: <87d0jj6fcw.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1hanJ0-0004Mt-F4;;;mid=<87d0jj6fcw.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=72.206.97.68;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX189A/VSwxzSPDX2+S4ja+GoE9kSbIKyFe0= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 72.206.97.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: [GIT PULL] Minor ptrace fixes for v5.2-rc5 X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Linus, Please pull the for-linus branch from the git tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-linus HEAD:f6581f5b55141a95657ef5742cf6a6bfa20a109f ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access() This is just two very minor fixes. Preventing ptrace from reading unitialized kernel memory found twice by syzkaller, and restoring a missing smp_rmb in ptrace_may_access and commening it so it is not removed by accident again. Apologies for being a little slow about getting this to you, I am still figuring out how to develop with a little baby in the house. Eric W. Biederman (1): signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO Jann Horn (1): ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access() kernel/cred.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/ptrace.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 45d77284aed0..07e069d00696 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -450,6 +450,15 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) if (task->mm) set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); task->pdeath_signal = 0; + /* + * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable, + * the dumpability change must become visible before + * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access() + * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it + * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped + * privileges without becoming nondumpable). + * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access(). + */ smp_wmb(); } diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 6f357f4fc859..c9b4646ad375 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -323,6 +323,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) return -EPERM; ok: rcu_read_unlock(); + /* + * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable (through a syscall + * like setresuid()) while we are trying to access it, we must ensure + * that the dumpability is read after the credentials; otherwise, + * we may be able to attach to a task that we shouldn't be able to + * attach to (as if the task had dropped privileges without becoming + * nondumpable). + * Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds(). + */ + smp_rmb(); mm = task->mm; if (mm && ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) && @@ -704,6 +714,10 @@ static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child, if (arg.nr < 0) return -EINVAL; + /* Ensure arg.off fits in an unsigned long */ + if (arg.off > ULONG_MAX) + return 0; + if (arg.flags & PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED) pending = &child->signal->shared_pending; else @@ -711,18 +725,20 @@ static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child, for (i = 0; i < arg.nr; ) { kernel_siginfo_t info; - s32 off = arg.off + i; + unsigned long off = arg.off + i; + bool found = false; spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock); list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) { if (!off--) { + found = true; copy_siginfo(&info, &q->info); break; } } spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock); - if (off >= 0) /* beyond the end of the list */ + if (!found) /* beyond the end of the list */ break; #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT Eric