From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751715AbdINRd0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Sep 2017 13:33:26 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:42863 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751458AbdINRdX (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Sep 2017 13:33:23 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, Linux Containers , Linux API , Linux Audit , Linux FS Devel , Linux Kernel , Linux Network Development , Aristeu Rozanski , David Howells , Eric Paris , jlayton@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski , mszeredi@redhat.com, Paul Moore , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Steve Grubb , trondmy@primarydata.com, Al Viro References: <20170913171328.GP3405@madcap2.tricolour.ca> Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2017 12:33:06 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20170913171328.GP3405@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (Richard Guy Briggs's message of "Wed, 13 Sep 2017 13:13:28 -0400") Message-ID: <87d16tb2y5.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1dsY0u-0004wS-Mf;;;mid=<87d16tb2y5.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=12.145.98.253;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/Kn+Vq6ys9O3vTBSNdcqEzWJKyLjkZFDQ= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 12.145.98.253 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa05 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa05 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Richard Guy Briggs X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 524 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.04 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 3.3 (0.6%), b_tie_ro: 2.2 (0.4%), parse: 1.25 (0.2%), extract_message_metadata: 3.7 (0.7%), get_uri_detail_list: 1.18 (0.2%), tests_pri_-1000: 6 (1.2%), tests_pri_-950: 1.64 (0.3%), tests_pri_-900: 1.38 (0.3%), tests_pri_-400: 22 (4.2%), check_bayes: 21 (4.0%), b_tokenize: 9 (1.6%), b_tok_get_all: 6 (1.1%), b_comp_prob: 2.1 (0.4%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.3 (0.4%), b_finish: 0.69 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 469 (89.5%), check_dkim_signature: 0.55 (0.1%), check_dkim_adsp: 4.1 (0.8%), tests_pri_500: 3.9 (0.7%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: RFC: Audit Kernel Container IDs X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Richard Guy Briggs writes: > The trigger is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already exists) > write of a u64 representing the container ID to a file representing a > process that will become the first process in a new container. > This might place restrictions on mount namespaces required to define a > container, or at least careful checking of namespaces in the kernel to > verify permissions of the orchestrator so it can't change its own > container ID. Why a u64? Why a proc filesystem write and not a magic audit message? I don't like the fact that the proc filesystem entry is likely going to be readable and abusable by non-audit contexts? Why the ability to change the containerid? What is the use case you are thinking of there? Eric