From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>,
Michal Koutn?? <mkoutny@suse.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:23:40 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87ee45v5dv.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87k0dxv5eq.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Mon, 14 Feb 2022 09:23:09 -0600")
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> writes:
> Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> writes:
>
>> On Thu, Feb 10, 2022 at 08:13:21PM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>> While examining is_ucounts_overlimit and reading the various messages
>>> I realized that is_ucounts_overlimit fails to deal with counts that
>>> may have wrapped.
>>>
>>> Being wrapped should be a transitory state for counts and they should
>>> never be wrapped for long, but it can happen so handle it.
>>>
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>> Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
>>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>> ---
>>> kernel/ucount.c | 3 ++-
>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
>>> index 65b597431c86..06ea04d44685 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/ucount.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/ucount.c
>>> @@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ bool is_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, unsign
>>> if (rlimit > LONG_MAX)
>>> max = LONG_MAX;
>>> for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
>>> - if (get_ucounts_value(iter, type) > max)
>>> + long val = get_ucounts_value(iter, type);
>>> + if (val < 0 || val > max)
>>> return true;
>>> max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]);
>>> }
>>
>> You probably deliberately assume "gcc -fwrapv", but otherwise:
>>
>> As you're probably aware, a signed integer wrapping is undefined
>> behavior in C. In the function above, "val" having wrapped to negative
>> assumes we had occurred UB elsewhere. Further, there's an instance of
>> UB in the function itself:
>
> While in cases like this we pass the value in a long, the operations on
> the value occur in an atomic_long_t. As atomic_long_t is implemented in
> assembly we do escape the problems of undefined behavior.
>
>
>> bool is_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, unsigned long rlimit)
>> {
>> struct ucounts *iter;
>> long max = rlimit;
>> if (rlimit > LONG_MAX)
>> max = LONG_MAX;
>>
>> The assignment on "long max = rlimit;" would have already been UB if
>> "rlimit > LONG_MAX", which is only checked afterwards. I think the
>> above would be better written as:
>>
>> if (rlimit > LONG_MAX)
>> rlimit = LONG_MAX;
>> long max = rlimit;
>>
>> considering that "rlimit" is never used further in that function.
>
> Thank you for spotting that. That looks like a good idea. Even if it
> works in this case it is better to establish patterns that are not
> problematic if copy and pasted elsewhere.
>
>> And to more likely avoid wraparound of "val", perhaps have the limit at
>> a value significantly lower than LONG_MAX, like half that? So:
>
> For the case of RLIMIT_NPROC the real world limit is PID_MAX_LIMIT
> which is 2^22.
>
> Beyond that the code deliberately uses all values with the high bit/sign
> bit set to flag that things went too high. So the code already reserves
> half of the values.
>
>> I assume that once is_ucounts_overlimit() returned true, it is expected
>> the value would almost not grow further (except a little due to races).
>
> Pretty much. The function essentially only exists so that we can
> handle the weirdness of RLIMIT_NPROC. Now that I have discovered the
> weirdness of RLIMIT_NPROC is old historical sloppiness I expect the
> proper solution is to rework how RLIMIT_NPROC operates and to remove
> is_ucounts_overlimit all together. I have to figure out what a proper
> RLIMIT_NPROC check looks like in proc.
^^^^ execve
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-14 15:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-07 12:17 [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] set_user: Perform RLIMIT_NPROC capability check against new user credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:14 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-10 1:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 20:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:14 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-15 11:55 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] set*uid: Check RLIMIT_PROC against new credentials Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] cred: Count tasks by their real uid into RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] ucounts: Allow root to override RLIMIT_NPROC Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 0:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-07 12:17 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] selftests: Challenge RLIMIT_NPROC in user namespaces Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:22 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15 9:45 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-07 12:18 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] selftests: Test RLIMIT_NPROC in clone-created " Michal Koutný
2022-02-10 1:25 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-15 9:34 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-08 13:54 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:01 ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 1/8] ucounts: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 18:37 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 2/8] ucounts: Fix set_cred_ucounts Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:10 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 3/8] ucounts: Fix and simplify RLIMIT_NPROC handling during setuid()+execve Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 23:17 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 17:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:25 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 4/8] ucounts: Only except the root user in init_user_ns from RLIMIT_NPROC Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 10:54 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 5/8] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-12 22:36 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-14 15:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-14 15:23 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-02-15 11:25 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-14 17:16 ` David Laight
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 6/8] ucounts: Handle inc_rlimit_ucounts wrapping in fork Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 11:34 ` Alexey Gladkov
2022-02-11 17:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:32 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 18:40 ` Alexey Gladkov
2022-02-11 19:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 7/8] rlimit: For RLIMIT_NPROC test the child not the parent for capabilites Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 2:13 ` [PATCH 8/8] ucounts: Use the same code to enforce RLIMIT_NPROC in fork and exec Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-11 18:22 ` [PATCH 0/8] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes Shuah Khan
2022-02-11 19:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-15 11:37 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-16 15:56 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] rlimit: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement failure caused by capability calls in set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:42 ` Solar Designer
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] ucounts: Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC not RLIMIT_NPROC+1 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] ucounts: Base set_cred_ucounts changes on the real user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 15:58 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] ucounts: Handle wrapping in is_ucounts_overlimit Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-16 17:28 ` Shuah Khan
2022-02-18 15:34 ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: RLIMIT_NPROC fixes for v5.17 Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-20 19:05 ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-03-03 0:12 ` [GIT PULL] ucounts: Regression fix " Eric W. Biederman
2022-03-03 0:30 ` pr-tracker-bot
2022-02-12 15:32 ` [RFC PATCH 0/6] RLIMIT_NPROC in ucounts fixups Etienne Dechamps
2022-02-15 10:11 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-23 0:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 18:00 ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-23 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-23 21:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2022-02-23 19:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24 1:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 1:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-24 2:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 15:41 ` [PATCH] ucounts: Fix systemd LimigtNPROC with private users regression Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 16:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-02-24 18:53 ` Michal Koutný
2022-02-25 0:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-24 3:00 ` How should rlimits, suid exec, and capabilities interact? David Laight
2022-02-24 1:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
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