Re: [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Christian Borntraeger
2019-12-12T17:31:48Z

On 11.12.19 21:47, Marios Pomonis wrote:
> This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
> and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
> These functions contain index computations that use the
> (attacker-controlled) MSR number.
>
> Fixes: commit e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
>
> Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 10 ++++++----
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> index 23ff65504d7e..26408434b9bc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
> @@ -809,11 +809,12 @@ static int kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> u32 index, u64 *pdata)
> {
> struct kvm_hv *hv = &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv;
> + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
>
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param)))
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
> return -EINVAL;

The fact that we do a WARN_ON_ONCE here, should actually tell that index is not
user controllable. Otherwise this would indicate the possibility to trigger a
kernel warning from a malicious user space. So
a: we do not need this change
or
b: we must also fix the WARN_ON_ONCE