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From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: objtool clac/stac handling change..
Date: Fri, 03 Jul 2020 13:17:22 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h7up70e5.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8be7cf19-9fc9-ce9c-091f-c8824a01a3c8@csgroup.eu>

Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> writes:
> Le 02/07/2020 à 15:34, Michael Ellerman a écrit :
>> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> writes:
>>> On Wed, Jul 1, 2020 at 12:59 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 12:04:36PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> That's actually for the access granting. Shutting the access down ends
>>>>> up always doing the same thing anyway..
>>>>
>>>> #define user_read_access_end            prevent_current_read_from_user
>>>> #define user_write_access_end           prevent_current_write_to_user
>>>> static inline void prevent_current_read_from_user(void)
>>>> {
>>>>          prevent_user_access(NULL, NULL, ~0UL, KUAP_CURRENT_READ);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> static inline void prevent_current_write_to_user(void)
>>>> {
>>>>          prevent_user_access(NULL, NULL, ~0UL, KUAP_CURRENT_WRITE);
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> and prevent_user_access() has instances that do care about the direction...
>>>
>>> Go and look closer.
>>>
>>> There are three cases:
>>>
>>>   (a) the 32-bit book3s case. It looks like it cares, but when you look
>>> closer, it ends up not caring about the read side, and saving the
>>> "which address to I allow user writes to" in current->thread.kuap
>>>
>>>   (b) the nohash 32-bit case - doesn't care
>>>
>>>   (c) the 64-bit books case - doesn't care
>>>
>>> So yes, in the (a) case it does make a difference between reads and
>>> writes, but at least as far as I can tell, it ignores the read case,
>>> and has code to avoid the unnecessary "disable user writes" case when
>>> there was only a read enable done.
>> 
>> Yeah that's my understanding too.
>> 
>> Christophe is the expert on that code so I'll defer to him if I'm wrong.
>> 
>>> Now, it's possible that I'm wrong, but the upshot of that is that even
>>> on powerpc, I think that if we just made the rule be that "taking a
>>> user exception should automatically do the 'user_access_end()' for us"
>>> is trivial.
>> 
>> I think we can do something to make it work.
>> 
>> We don't have an equivalent of x86's ex_handler_uaccess(), so it's not
>> quite as easy as whacking a user_access_end() in there.
>
> Isn't it something easy to do in bad_page_fault() ?

We'd need to do it there at least.

But I'm not convinced that's the only place we'd need to do it. We could
theoretically take a machine check on a user access, and those are
handled differently on each sub-(sub-sub)-platform, and I think all or
most of them don't call bad_page_fault().

> Not exactly a call to user_access_end() but altering regs->kuap so that 
> user access is not restored on exception exit.

Yes.

>> Probably the simplest option for us is to just handle it in our
>> unsafe_op_wrap(). I'll try and come up with something tomorrow.
>
> unsafe_op_wrap() is not used anymore for unsafe_put_user() as we are now 
> using asm goto.

Sure, but we could change it back to use unsafe_op_wrap().

I did a quick hack to do that and see no difference in the generated
code, but your commit adding put_user_goto() did show better code
generation, so possibly it depends on compiler version, or my example
wasn't complicated enough (filldir()).

cheers

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-03  3:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-01 18:22 objtool clac/stac handling change Linus Torvalds
2020-07-01 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-01 19:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-01 20:36     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-01 20:51       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-07-01 21:02         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02  0:00           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-07-02  8:05             ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-07-01 20:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02  0:47         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-02  2:30           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02  2:35             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02  3:08             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-01 18:41 ` Al Viro
2020-07-01 19:04   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-01 19:59     ` Al Viro
2020-07-01 20:25       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02 13:34         ` Michael Ellerman
2020-07-02 14:01           ` Al Viro
2020-07-02 14:04             ` Al Viro
2020-07-02 15:13           ` Christophe Leroy
2020-07-02 20:13             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-03  3:59               ` Michael Ellerman
2020-07-03  3:17             ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
2020-07-03  5:27               ` Christophe Leroy
2020-07-02 19:52           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02 20:17             ` Al Viro
2020-07-02 20:32               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-02 20:59                 ` Al Viro
2020-07-02 21:55                   ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-03  1:33                     ` Al Viro
2020-07-03  3:32                       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-03 21:02                       ` Al Viro
2020-07-03 21:10                         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-03 21:41                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-03 22:25                             ` Al Viro
2020-07-03 21:59                           ` Al Viro
2020-07-03 22:04                             ` Al Viro
2020-07-03 22:12                           ` Al Viro
2020-07-04  0:49                         ` Al Viro
2020-07-04  1:54                           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-04  2:30                             ` Al Viro
2020-07-04  3:06                               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-04  2:11                           ` Al Viro
2020-07-07 12:35                             ` David Laight
2020-07-10 22:37                               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-07-13  9:32                                 ` David Laight

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