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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp.2:  Clarify that bad system calls kill the thread
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 15:11:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87k0mbp0yc.fsf_-_@disp2133> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202106292156.9458CF22@keescook> (Kees Cook's message of "Tue, 29 Jun 2021 22:23:06 -0700")


Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 man2/seccomp.2 | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/man2/seccomp.2 b/man2/seccomp.2
index a3421871f0f4..bde54c3e3e99 100644
--- a/man2/seccomp.2
+++ b/man2/seccomp.2
@@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ The only system calls that the calling thread is permitted to make are
 .BR exit_group (2)),
 and
 .BR sigreturn (2).
-Other system calls result in the delivery of a
+Other system calls result in the termination of the calling thread,
+or termination of the entire process with the
 .BR SIGKILL
-signal.
+signal when there is only one thread.
 Strict secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching
 applications that may need to execute untrusted byte code, perhaps
 obtained by reading from a pipe or socket.
-- 
2.29.2

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-30 20:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-29 22:54 Semantics of SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT? Eric W. Biederman
2021-06-30  5:02 ` Aleksa Sarai
2021-06-30  5:23 ` Kees Cook
2021-06-30 20:11   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2021-06-30 23:06     ` [PATCH] seccomp.2: Clarify that bad system calls kill the thread Kees Cook
2021-08-10  2:07     ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)

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