Re: [PATCHv6 07/30] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest

Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-03-18T15:35:08Z

On Fri, Mar 18, 2022 at 03:19:34PM +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 17 2022 at 21:21, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 17, 2022 at 08:33:54PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> - in NMI entry code (asm_exc_nmi()) before NMI nesting is safe:
> >> + for NMI from user mode, before switched to thread stack
> >> + for NMI from kernel, up to end_repead_nmi
> >>
> >> After that points #VE is safe.
> >
> > In what way is it guaranteed that #VE isn't raised in those places? What
> > does an auditor / future coder looking to changes things, need to
> > consider to keep this so.
> >
> > From vague memories #VE can be raised on any memop, loading the stack
> > address in the syscall-gap is a memop. What makes that special? Can we
> > get a comment _there_ to explain how this is safe such that we can keep
> > it so?
> >
> > Same for the NMI path I suppose.
>
> #VE is raised by HLT, CPUID, I/O-Port access, MSR read/write, EPT violations
>
> So in the hairy places:
>
> - HLT: No business
> - I/O Ports: That would be outright stupid to use
>
> - CPUID: Should never be used - Emphasis on should :)
> - MSRs: Same as CPUID
>
> - EPT: Well....

EPT violation may result in #VE only on shared memory. If entry code
touches shared memory we have a bigger problem than syscall gap.

--
Kirill A. Shutemov