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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks
Date: Tue, 19 May 2020 13:42:28 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sgfvrckr.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202005191052.0A6B1D5843@keescook> (Kees Cook's message of "Tue, 19 May 2020 10:56:08 -0700")

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:

> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 12:41:27PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:
>> > and given the LSM hooks, I think the noexec check is too late as well.
>> > (This is especially true for the coming O_MAYEXEC series, which will
>> > absolutely need those tests earlier as well[1] -- the permission checking
>> > is then in the correct place: during open, not exec.) I think the only
>> > question is about leaving the redundant checks in fs/exec.c, which I
>> > think are a cheap way to retain a sense of robustness.
>> 
>> The trouble is when someone passes through changes one of the permission
>> checks for whatever reason (misses that they are duplicated in another
>> location) and things then fail in some very unexpected way.
>
> Do you think this series should drop the "late" checks in fs/exec.c?
> Honestly, the largest motivation for me to move the checks earlier as
> I've done is so that other things besides execve() can use FMODE_EXEC
> during open() and receive the same sanity-checking as execve() (i.e the
> O_MAYEXEC series -- the details are still under discussion but this
> cleanup will be needed regardless).

I think this series should drop the "late" checks in fs/exec.c  It feels
less error prone, and it feels like that would transform this into
something Linus would be eager to merge because series becomes a cleanup
that reduces line count.

I haven't been inside of open recently enough to remember if the
location you are putting the check fundamentally makes sense.  But the
O_MAYEXEC bits make a pretty strong case that something of the sort
needs to happen.

I took a quick look but I can not see clearly where path_noexec
and the regular file tests should go.

I do see that you have code duplication with faccessat which suggests
that you haven't put the checks in the right place.

I am wondering if we need something distinct to request the type of the
file being opened versus execute permissions.

All I know is being careful and putting the tests in a good logical
place makes the code more maintainable, whereas not being careful
results in all kinds of sharp corners that might be exploitable.
So I think it is worth digging in and figuring out where those checks
should live.  Especially so that code like faccessat does not need
to duplicate them.

Eric


  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-19 18:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-18  5:54 [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks Kees Cook
2020-05-18  5:54 ` [PATCH 1/4] exec: Change uselib(2) IS_SREG() failure to EACCES Kees Cook
2020-05-18 13:02   ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-18 14:43     ` Jann Horn
2020-05-18 14:46       ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-18 23:57         ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19  8:11           ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-19  8:37           ` Andreas Schwab
2020-05-19 11:56             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 12:12               ` Andreas Schwab
2020-05-19 12:28                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 13:29                   ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-19 14:49                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 13:13               ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-19 14:32                 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2020-05-19 14:47                   ` Christian Brauner
2020-05-18  5:54 ` [PATCH 2/4] exec: Relocate S_ISREG() check Kees Cook
     [not found]   ` <20200525091420.GI12456@shao2-debian>
2020-06-04 22:45     ` [exec] 166d03c9ec: ltp.execveat02.fail Kees Cook
2020-06-05  2:57     ` Kees Cook
2020-05-18  5:54 ` [PATCH 3/4] exec: Relocate path_noexec() check Kees Cook
2020-05-18  5:54 ` [PATCH 4/4] fs: Include FMODE_EXEC when converting flags to f_mode Kees Cook
2020-05-19 15:06 ` [PATCH 0/4] Relocate execve() sanity checks Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 16:26   ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 17:41     ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-05-19 17:56       ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 18:42         ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2020-05-19 21:17           ` Kees Cook
2020-05-19 22:58             ` John Johansen

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