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From: Olaf Dietsche <olaf.dietsche#list.linux-kernel@t-online.de>
To: <chris@scary.beasts.org>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <drepper@redhat.com>, <agruen@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.44 (1/2): Filesystem capabilities kernel patch
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2002 12:08:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87smypmrio.fsf@goat.bogus.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 877kg2njbi.fsf@goat.bogus.local

Olaf Dietsche <olaf.dietsche#list.linux-kernel@t-online.de> writes:

> Olaf Dietsche <olaf.dietsche#list.linux-kernel@t-online.de> writes:
>
>> <chris@scary.beasts.org> writes:
>>
>>> On Mon, 28 Oct 2002, Olaf Dietsche wrote:
>>>
>>>> If you're careful with giving away capabilities however, this patch
>>>> can make your system more secure as it is. But this isn't fully
>>>> explored, so you might achieve the opposite and open new security
>>>> holes.
>
> Famous last words :-(
>
>>>
>>> Have you checked how glibc handles an executable with filesystem
>>> capabilities? e.g. can an LD_PRELOAD hack subvert the privileged
>>> executable?
>>
>> No, I didn't check. Thanks for this hint, I will look into this.

Executables with inheritable sets only are not affected. A regular
user may use LD_PRELOAD, but he is not able to gain additional
privileges.

> I just downloaded glibc 2.3.1 and would say you can subvert a
> privileged executable with LD_PRELOAD. There's no mention of
> PR_GET_DUMPABLE anywhere and __libc_enable_secure is set according to
> some euid/egid tests.

This means setting the executable to SGID nogroup or a similar hack
would close at least some of the security holes for now.

Regards, Olaf.

  reply	other threads:[~2002-10-29 11:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2002-10-18 19:07 [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.42 (1/2): Filesystem capabilities kernel patch Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-18 23:00 ` Alexander Viro
2002-10-19  0:07   ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-19  0:25     ` Alexander Viro
2002-10-24 12:25       ` [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.44 " Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-28 22:56         ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-28 23:36           ` chris
2002-10-29  0:20             ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-29  1:08               ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-29 11:08                 ` Olaf Dietsche [this message]
2002-10-29 11:18                 ` Chris Evans
2002-10-29  2:23             ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2002-10-29 11:09               ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-29 11:35                 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2002-10-29 12:04                 ` __libc_enable_secure check (was: [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.44 (1/2): Filesystem capabilities kernel patch) Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-29 14:38                 ` [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.44 (1/2): Filesystem capabilities kernel patch Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-20  0:24 ` [PATCH][RFC] 2.5.42 " Andreas Gruenbacher
2002-10-21 15:25   ` Olaf Dietsche
2002-10-21 22:03     ` Andreas Gruenbacher

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