From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.18 01/11] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2022 08:28:27 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87tu8muhkk.fsf@meer.lwn.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220615032507.go6t24dyzotpe3xv@guptapa-desk>
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> writes:
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 08:06:37AM +0700, Bagas Sanjaya wrote:
>>On 6/15/22 01:40, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>>> + .. list-table::
>>> +
>>> + * - 'Not affected'
>>> + - The processor is not vulnerable
>>> + * - 'Vulnerable'
>>> + - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
>>> + * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
>>> + - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
>>> + mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
>>> + * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
>>> + - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
>>> + enabled.
>>> +
>>> +If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
>>> +the above information:
>>> +
>>> + ======================== ===========================================
>>> + 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
>>> + 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
>>> + 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
>>> + ======================== ===========================================
>>> +
>>
>>Why is list-table used in sysfs table instead of usual ASCII table in SMT
>>vulnerabilities list above? I think using ASCII table in both cases is enough
>>for the purpose.
>
> Maybe you are right (and I am no expert in this), but quite a few
> documents use list-table for sysfs status:
>
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
List-table should really be avoided whenever possible; it makes reading
the plain-text files difficult at best. I'd like to see the existing
uses taken out over time.
This isn't really something to be addressed in the stable updates,
though.
jon
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-15 14:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-14 18:40 [PATCH 5.18 00/11] 5.18.5-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/11] Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-15 1:06 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-06-15 3:25 ` Pawan Gupta
2022-06-15 14:28 ` Jonathan Corbet [this message]
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/11] x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/11] x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/11] x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/11] KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 18:40 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/11] x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-14 22:23 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/11] 5.18.5-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-15 2:22 ` Fox Chen
2022-06-15 2:47 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-15 5:54 ` Ron Economos
2022-06-15 6:59 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-06-15 14:06 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-06-15 18:12 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-06-15 22:04 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-16 10:06 ` Jon Hunter
2022-06-16 12:54 ` Justin Forbes
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