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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Guilherme G . Piccoli" <gpiccoli@igalia.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization in an emergency if SVM is supported
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 12:57:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87tu9vvx19.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220511234332.3654455-3-seanjc@google.com>

On Wed, May 11 2022 at 23:43, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Disable SVM on all CPUs via NMI shootdown during an emergency reboot.
> Like VMX, SVM can block INIT and thus prevent bringing up other CPUs via
> INIT-SIPI-SIPI.

With the delta patch applied, I'd make that:

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -530,29 +530,25 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void)
 
 static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void);
 
-/* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */
-static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
+static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
 {
 	/* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */
 	local_irq_disable();
 
 	/*
-	 * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
-	 * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
+	 * Disable virtualization on all CPUs before rebooting to avoid hanging
+	 * the system, as VMX and SVM block INIT when running in the host
 	 *
 	 * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
-	 * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
+	 * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable VMX/SVM and halt.
 	 *
-	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
-	 * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
+	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if virtualization is off on _this_ CPU, as
+	 * other CPUs may have virtualization enabled.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
-		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
-		__cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
+	cpu_crash_disable_virtualization();
 
-		/* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx() || cpu_has_svm(NULL))
 		nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart();
-	}
 }
 
 
@@ -587,7 +583,7 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_res
 	unsigned short mode;
 
 	if (reboot_emergency)
-		emergency_vmx_disable_all();
+		emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization();
 
 	tboot_shutdown(TB_SHUTDOWN_REBOOT);
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-12 10:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-11 23:43 [PATCH 0/2] x86/crash: Fix double list_add nmi_shootdown bug Sean Christopherson
2022-05-11 23:43 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/crash: Disable virt in core NMI crash handler to avoid double list_add Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12  9:14   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-05-12 10:51   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-12 14:14     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 14:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 15:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-11 23:43 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization in an emergency if SVM is supported Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12  8:37   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2022-05-12 10:57   ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2022-05-12 14:39     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-05-12 15:47       ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-13 11:10 ` [PATCH] x86/nmi: Make register_nmi_handler() more robust Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 11:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-15 11:39   ` [PATCH V2] " Thomas Gleixner
2022-05-17  7:34 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

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