public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
To: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
	"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
	"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 22:02:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87v7evo5c8.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7b942738-231b-4168-8d97-0e5c974af2e9@efficios.com>

On Mon, Mar 16 2026 at 15:19, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
> On 2026-03-16 13:13, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void __user *x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(struct pt_regs *regs)
>> +{
>> +	return (void __user *)regs->dx;
>
> When userspace is compat 32-bit, with a 64-bit kernel, are we sure that
> the 32 upper bits are cleared ? If not can we rely on
> compat_robust_list_clear_pending to ignore those top bits in
> put_user(0U, pop) ?

Which compat version are you talking about?

  1) A 32-bit application which truly runs as compat

  2) A 64-bit application which uses both variants and invokes the
     64-bit VDSO from a 32-bit program segment

#1 is inherently safe. The 32-bit application uses the compat 32-bit VDSO
   which only accesses the lower half of the registers. So the mov $ptr,
   %edx results in zero extending the 32-bit value. From the SDM:

     "32-bit operands generate a 32-bit result, zero-extended to a
      64-bit result in the destination general-purpose register."

   The exception/interrupt entry switches into 64-bit mode, but due to
   the above the upper 32 bit are 0. So it's safe to just blindly use
   regs->dx.

   Otherwise it would be pretty impossible to run 32-bit user space on a
   64-bit kernel.

#2 can really be assumed to be safe as there must be some magic
   translation in the emulation code which handles the different calling
   conventions.

   That's not any different when 32-bit code which runs in the context
   of a 64-bit application invokes a syscall or a library function.

   If that goes wrong, then it's not a kernel problem because the
   application explicitely tells the kernel to corrupt it's own memory.
   
   The golden rule of UNIX applies here as always:

       Do what user space asked for unless it results in a boundary
       violation which can't be achieved by user space itself.

       IOW, let user space shoot itself into the foot when it desires to
       do so.

Thanks,

        tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-16 21:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-16 17:12 [patch 0/8] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:12 ` [patch 1/8] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:55   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17  2:24   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17  9:52     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 2/8] futex: Move futex related mm_struct " Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:00   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 3/8] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:02   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17  2:38   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17  9:53     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 4/8] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:24   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 16:17   ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 20:46     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-17 22:40       ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18  8:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18  8:06           ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-18 14:47           ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 16:03             ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 5/8] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:36   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 19:19   ` André Almeida
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 6/8] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:35   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 20:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 20:52       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 7/8] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 19:19   ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:02     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2026-03-16 22:35       ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 21:29     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17  7:25   ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-17  9:51     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 11:17       ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-18 16:17         ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19  7:41           ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19  8:53             ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-19  9:04               ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19  9:08               ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 23:31                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 10:36             ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-19 10:49               ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 10:55                 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-17  8:28   ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17  9:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 10:37       ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 22:32         ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:08           ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:10             ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19  2:05             ` André Almeida
2026-03-19  7:10               ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 15:33   ` Uros Bizjak
2026-03-18  8:21     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18  8:32       ` Uros Bizjak

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87v7evo5c8.ffs@tglx \
    --to=tglx@kernel.org \
    --cc=Liam.Howlett@oracle.com \
    --cc=andrealmeid@igalia.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=carlos@redhat.com \
    --cc=dalias@aerifal.cx \
    --cc=dave@stgolabs.net \
    --cc=dvhart@infradead.org \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=triegel@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox