From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
To: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock()
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 22:02:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87v7evo5c8.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7b942738-231b-4168-8d97-0e5c974af2e9@efficios.com>
On Mon, Mar 16 2026 at 15:19, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
> On 2026-03-16 13:13, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void __user *x86_futex_robust_unlock_get_pop(struct pt_regs *regs)
>> +{
>> + return (void __user *)regs->dx;
>
> When userspace is compat 32-bit, with a 64-bit kernel, are we sure that
> the 32 upper bits are cleared ? If not can we rely on
> compat_robust_list_clear_pending to ignore those top bits in
> put_user(0U, pop) ?
Which compat version are you talking about?
1) A 32-bit application which truly runs as compat
2) A 64-bit application which uses both variants and invokes the
64-bit VDSO from a 32-bit program segment
#1 is inherently safe. The 32-bit application uses the compat 32-bit VDSO
which only accesses the lower half of the registers. So the mov $ptr,
%edx results in zero extending the 32-bit value. From the SDM:
"32-bit operands generate a 32-bit result, zero-extended to a
64-bit result in the destination general-purpose register."
The exception/interrupt entry switches into 64-bit mode, but due to
the above the upper 32 bit are 0. So it's safe to just blindly use
regs->dx.
Otherwise it would be pretty impossible to run 32-bit user space on a
64-bit kernel.
#2 can really be assumed to be safe as there must be some magic
translation in the emulation code which handles the different calling
conventions.
That's not any different when 32-bit code which runs in the context
of a 64-bit application invokes a syscall or a library function.
If that goes wrong, then it's not a kernel problem because the
application explicitely tells the kernel to corrupt it's own memory.
The golden rule of UNIX applies here as always:
Do what user space asked for unless it results in a boundary
violation which can't be achieved by user space itself.
IOW, let user space shoot itself into the foot when it desires to
do so.
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-16 21:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-16 17:12 [patch 0/8] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:12 ` [patch 1/8] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:55 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 2:24 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 9:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 2/8] futex: Move futex related mm_struct " Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:00 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 3/8] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:02 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 2:38 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 9:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 4/8] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:24 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 16:17 ` André Almeida
2026-03-17 20:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-17 22:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 8:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 8:06 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-18 14:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-18 16:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 5/8] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:36 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-17 19:19 ` André Almeida
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 6/8] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 18:35 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 20:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 20:52 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 7/8] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 17:13 ` [patch 8/8] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 19:19 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:02 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2026-03-16 22:35 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2026-03-16 21:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-16 21:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 7:25 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-17 9:51 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 11:17 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-18 16:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 7:41 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 8:53 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-19 9:04 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 23:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-19 10:36 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-19 10:49 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-03-19 10:55 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
2026-03-17 8:28 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 9:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 10:37 ` Florian Weimer
2026-03-17 22:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 22:10 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-03-19 2:05 ` André Almeida
2026-03-19 7:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-17 15:33 ` Uros Bizjak
2026-03-18 8:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-03-18 8:32 ` Uros Bizjak
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