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From: Alex Murray <alex.murray@canonical.com>
To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de,linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,tglx@linutronix.de,x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] x86/cpu/bugs: Consider having old Intel microcode to be a vulnerability
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 17:07:27 +1030	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87v7wtvty0.fsf@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241107170630.2A92B8D3@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>

> 
> == Microcode Revision Discussion ==
> 
> The microcode versions in the table were generated from the Intel
> microcode git repo:
>
>  	29f82f7429c ("microcode-20241029 Release")

This upstream microcode release only contained an update for a
functional issue[1] - not any fixes for security issues. So it would not
really be correct to say a machine running the previous microcode
revision is vulnerable. As such, should the table of microcode revisions
only be generated from the upstream microcode releases that contain
fixes for security issues? 

ie.

> +{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6,  .model = 0xb7, .steppings = 0x0002, .driver_data = 0x12b }

should ideally be:

> +{ .flags = X86_CPU_ID_FLAG_ENTRY_VALID, .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 0x6,  .model = 0xb7, .steppings = 0x0002, .driver_data = 0x129 }

to correspond with the previous microcode release that contained actual
security fixes. 


[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/releases/tag/microcode-20241029

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-11-12  6:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-07 17:06 [RFC][PATCH] x86/cpu/bugs: Consider having old Intel microcode to be a vulnerability Dave Hansen
2024-11-08 23:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-11-12 17:15   ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-12  6:37 ` Alex Murray [this message]
2024-11-12 15:51   ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-13  3:29     ` Alex Murray
2024-11-13 16:00       ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-13 23:58         ` Alex Murray
2024-11-14  0:37           ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-18  8:35             ` Alex Murray
2024-11-13  9:28     ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-11-14  2:09   ` Andrew Cooper
2024-11-18 20:02     ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-19 17:45 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-19 18:49   ` Dave Hansen
2024-11-19 19:31     ` Pawan Gupta

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