From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>, Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@suse.cz>,
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
James Bottomley <james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>,
Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
Date: Sun, 01 Sep 2013 18:40:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87vc2ksdfa.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130901160429.GA1375@srcf.ucam.org> (Matthew Garrett's message of "Sun, 1 Sep 2013 17:04:29 +0100")
* Matthew Garrett:
> On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 12:41:22PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>
>> But if you don't generate fresh keys on every boot, the persistent
>> keys are mor exposed to other UEFI applications. Correct me if I'm
>> wrong, but I don't think UEFI variables are segregated between
>> different UEFI applications, so if anyone gets a generic UEFI variable
>> dumper (or setter) signed by the trusted key, this cryptographic
>> validation of hibernate snapshots is bypassable.
>
> If anyone can execute arbitrary code in your UEFI environment then
> you've already lost.
This is not about arbitrary code execution. The problematic
applications which conflict with this proposed functionality are not
necessarily malicious by themselves and even potentially useful.
For example, if you want to provision a bunch of machines and you have
to set certain UEFI variables, it might be helpful to do so in an
unattended fashion, just by booting from a USB stick with a suitable
UEFI application. Is this evil? I don't think so.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-01 16:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-22 11:01 [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 01/18] asymmetric keys: add interface and skeleton for implement signature generation Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 15:53 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:17 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:01 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-26 10:25 ` joeyli
2013-08-26 11:27 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 8:36 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 04/18] asymmetric keys: implement OS2IP in rsa Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 05/18] asymmetric keys: implement RSASP1 Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:10 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:13 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:14 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:16 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:22 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-25 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-03 10:49 ` Matt Fleming
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 11/18] Hibernate: introduced RSA key-pair to verify signature of snapshot Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:25 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 9:04 ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:29 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:01 ` Manfred Hollstein
2013-08-27 14:17 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 13:12 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 8:53 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 10:13 ` joeyli
2013-09-05 10:31 ` Matt Fleming
2013-09-05 13:28 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:36 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 3:22 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:39 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 8:33 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 14/18] Hibernate: applied SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION config to switch signature check Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 15/18] Hibernate: adapt to UEFI secure boot with " Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:42 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:14 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 16/18] Hibernate: show the verification time for monitor performance Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 17/18] Hibernate: introduced SNAPSHOT_SIG_HASH config for select hash algorithm Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-25 16:43 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 10:22 ` joeyli
2013-08-27 11:30 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-27 12:54 ` joeyli
2013-08-22 11:01 ` [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2013-08-28 21:01 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot Florian Weimer
2013-08-29 0:01 ` joeyli
2013-08-29 21:32 ` Pavel Machek
2013-08-29 22:30 ` joeyli
2013-09-01 10:41 ` Florian Weimer
2013-09-01 16:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-01 16:40 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2013-09-01 16:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-02 2:12 ` joeyli
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