From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Benjamin Gordon <bmgordon@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>,
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>,
Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>, Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>,
Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>,
Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: use ns_capable instead of capable for timerslack_ns
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 23:31:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y3ae3ffu.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181030180012.232896-1-bmgordon@google.com> (Benjamin Gordon's message of "Tue, 30 Oct 2018 12:00:12 -0600")
Benjamin Gordon <bmgordon@google.com> writes:
> Access to timerslack_ns is controlled by a process having CAP_SYS_NICE
> in its effective capability set, but the current check looks in the root
> namespace instead of the process' user namespace. Since a process is
> allowed to do other activities controlled by CAP_SYS_NICE inside a
> namespace, it should also be able to adjust timerslack_ns.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
I don't see any fundamental probess with how the processes user
namespace is being accessed. You can race with setns
and that may result in a descendent user namespace of the current
user namespace being set. But if you have permissions in the parent
user namespace you will have permissions over a child user namespace.
So the race can't effect the outcome of the ns_capable test.
That and while __task_cred(p) may change it is guaranteed there is a
valid one until __put_task_struct which only happens when a process has
a zero refcount. Which the success of get_proc_task in before these
checks already ensures is not true.
So from my perspective this looks like a reasonable change.
I don't know how this looks from people who understand the timer bits
and what timerslack does. I suspect it is reasonable as there is no
permission check for changing yourself.
Eric
> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gordon <bmgordon@google.com>
> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> ---
>
> Changes from v1:
> - Use the namespace of the target process instead of the file opener.
> Didn't carry over John Stultz' Acked-by since the changes aren't
> cosmetic.
>
> fs/proc/base.c | 12 +++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index c78d8da09b52c..bdc093ba81dd3 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2385,10 +2385,13 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> return -ESRCH;
>
> if (p != current) {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> count = -EPERM;
> goto out;
> }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
>
> err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
> if (err) {
> @@ -2421,11 +2424,14 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> return -ESRCH;
>
> if (p != current) {
> -
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> err = -EPERM;
> goto out;
> }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
> if (err)
> goto out;
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-31 4:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-30 18:00 [PATCH v2] proc: use ns_capable instead of capable for timerslack_ns Benjamin Gordon
2018-10-31 4:31 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
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