From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
ashok.raj@intel.com, jacob.jun.pan@intel.com, alan.cox@intel.com,
kevin.tian@intel.com, mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
pengfei.xu@intel.com, Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/9] swiotlb: Zero out bounce buffer for untrusted device
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 11:08:24 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8ad77caa-3245-4d06-314d-c4a92aa0f2ac@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190612010518.GB22479@char.us.oracle.com>
Hi,
On 6/12/19 9:05 AM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 08:43:40AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
>> Hi Konrad,
>>
>> Thanks a lot for your reviewing.
>>
>> On 6/10/19 11:45 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 09:16:14AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
>>>> This is necessary to avoid exposing valid kernel data to any
>>>> milicious device.
>>>
>>> malicious
>>
>> Yes, thanks.
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 6 ++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>>>> index f956f785645a..ed41eb7f6131 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
>>>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>>>> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>>>> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>>>> #include <linux/set_memory.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/pci.h>
>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
>>>> #include <linux/debugfs.h>
>>>> #endif
>>>> @@ -560,6 +561,11 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
>>>> */
>>>> for (i = 0; i < nslots; i++)
>>>> io_tlb_orig_addr[index+i] = orig_addr + (i << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Zero out the bounce buffer if the consumer is untrusted. */
>>>> + if (dev_is_untrusted(hwdev))
>>>> + memset(phys_to_virt(tlb_addr), 0, alloc_size);
>>>
>>> What if the alloc_size is less than a PAGE? Should this at least have ALIGN or such?
>>
>> It's the consumer (iommu subsystem) who requires this to be page
>> aligned. For swiotlb, it just clears out all data in the allocated
>> bounce buffer.
>
> I am thinking that the if you don't memset the full page the malicious hardware could read stale date from the rest of the page
> that hasn't been cleared?
Yes. My point is that this should be guaranteed by the bounce page
implementation in iommu.
Best regards,
Baolu
>
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Baolu
>>
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
>>>> (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
>>>> swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>>>> --
>>>> 2.17.1
>>>>
>>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-12 3:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-03 1:16 [PATCH v4 0/9] iommu: Bounce page for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] PCI: Add dev_is_untrusted helper Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] swiotlb: Split size parameter to map/unmap APIs Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] swiotlb: Zero out bounce buffer for untrusted device Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 0:43 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 1:05 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:08 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] iommu: Add bounce page APIs Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:56 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 0:45 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-11 12:10 ` Pavel Begunkov
2019-06-12 0:52 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] iommu/vt-d: Don't switch off swiotlb if use direct dma Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:54 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:03 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] iommu/vt-d: Check whether device requires bounce buffer Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:22 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] iommu/vt-d: Add trace events for domain map/unmap Lu Baolu
2019-06-04 9:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-06-05 6:48 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 16:08 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 2:31 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] iommu/vt-d: Code refactoring for bounce map and unmap Lu Baolu
2019-06-03 1:16 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] iommu/vt-d: Use bounce buffer for untrusted devices Lu Baolu
2019-06-10 15:42 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] iommu: Bounce page " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:00 ` Lu Baolu
2019-06-12 6:22 ` Mika Westerberg
2019-06-10 16:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-12 3:04 ` Lu Baolu
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