From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
lkp@01.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, tycho@docker.com,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, vgoyal@redhat.com,
christian.brauner@mailbox.org, amir73il@gmail.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 07:35:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8c3e8c6f-52c5-5b04-8cad-1aeae25f0ec6@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170712034503.GA8270@mail.hallyn.com>
On 07/11/2017 11:45 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (Stefan Bergerstefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> +/*
>> + * xattr_list_userns_rewrite - Rewrite list of xattr names for user namespaces
>> + * or determine needed size for attribute list
>> + * in case size == 0
>> + *
>> + * In a user namespace we do not present all extended attributes to the
>> + * user. We filter out those that are in the list of userns supported xattr.
>> + * Besides that we filter out those with @uid=<uid> when there is no mapping
>> + * for that uid in the current user namespace.
>> + *
>> + * @list: list of 0-byte separated xattr names
>> + * @size: the size of the list; may be 0 to determine needed list size
>> + * @list_maxlen: allocated buffer size of list
>> + */
>> +static ssize_t
>> +xattr_list_userns_rewrite(char *list, ssize_t size, size_t list_maxlen)
>> +{
>> + char *nlist = NULL;
>> + size_t s_off, len, nlen;
>> + ssize_t d_off;
>> + char *name, *newname;
>> +
>> + if (!list || size < 0 || current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns)
>> + return size;
>> +
>> + if (size) {
>> + nlist = kmalloc(list_maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!nlist)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + s_off = d_off = 0;
>> + while (s_off < size || size == 0) {
>> + name = &list[s_off];
>> +
>> + len = strlen(name);
>> + if (!len)
>> + break;
>> +
>> + if (xattr_is_userns_supported(name, false) >= 0)
>> + newname = name;
>> + else {
>> + newname = xattr_rewrite_userns_xattr(name);
> Why are you doing this here? If we get here it means that
> xattr_is_userns_supported() returned < 0, meaning name is
> not userns-supported. So xattr_rewrite_userns_xattr() will
> just return name. Am I missing something?
xattr_is_userns_support(name, false) does a _full string match_ rather
than a prefix match and will only return >= 0 for security.capability.
This case handles the hosts's security.capability which 'shines
through' for read and needs to be listed. Only in this case we set
newname=name.
In the else branch we handle security.capability@uid=1000 and rewrite
that to security.capability for root mapping to uid=1000.
>
>> + if (IS_ERR(newname)) {
>> + d_off = PTR_ERR(newname);
>> + goto out_free;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + if (newname && !xattr_list_contains(nlist, d_off, newname)) {
> Now here, if name was recalculated to @newname, and @newname is
> found in the nlist, that should raise an error right? Something
> fishy is going on?
If security.capability is set on a file but the container doesn't have
security.capability@uid=1000, we still need to list the former here.
However, we end up with duplicates if security.capability is there and
security.capability@uid=1000 is also there and root is mapped to
uid=1000. Both would be shown as security.capability inside the
container. In this case we need to filter.
I think the code is correct. More problematic is a memory leak in the
error case. Will fix that.
>
>> + nlen = strlen(newname);
>> +
>> + if (nlist) {
>> + if (nlen + 1 > list_maxlen)
> d_off needs to be set to -ERANGE here.
Fixed.
>
>> + break;
>> + strcpy(&nlist[d_off], newname);
>> + }
>> +
>> + d_off += nlen + 1;
>> + if (newname != name)
>> + kfree(newname);
>> + }
>> + s_off += len + 1;
>> + }
>> + if (nlist)
>> + memcpy(list, nlist, d_off);
>> +out_free:
>> + kfree(nlist);
>> +
>> + return d_off;
>> +}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-12 11:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-11 15:05 [PATCH v2] Enable namespaced file capabilities Stefan Berger
2017-07-11 15:05 ` [PATCH v2] xattr: Enable security.capability in user namespaces Stefan Berger
2017-07-11 17:12 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 0:15 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-12 0:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 3:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 11:35 ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2017-07-12 17:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 7:59 ` James Morris
2017-07-12 13:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-12 17:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 22:20 ` James Morris
2017-07-13 0:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 1:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 23:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 0:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 0:44 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 1:15 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 2:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 12:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 16:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 17:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 17:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 19:14 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-13 19:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-18 7:01 ` James Morris
2017-07-18 12:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 13:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 23:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 17:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 17:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-13 19:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <9a3010e5-ca2b-5e7a-656b-fcc14f7bec4e@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-14 0:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 11:32 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 12:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 12:39 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 13:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-14 15:22 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 17:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-14 18:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 18:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 18:52 ` James Bottomley
2017-07-14 20:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 20:39 ` James Bottomley
2017-07-14 21:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-14 23:22 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 23:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 19:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-07-14 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <xagsmtp2.20170714182525.6604@vmsdvm4.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-14 19:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-15 0:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <xagsmtp3.20170715001054.9173@uk1vsc.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-07-16 11:25 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-26 3:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-26 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-14 17:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-14 19:22 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-13 21:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 21:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-12 17:53 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-12 19:19 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-14 23:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-15 21:27 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-17 18:58 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-17 20:50 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 11:48 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 12:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 12:30 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 12:36 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 13:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:21 ` Stefan Berger
2017-07-18 14:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-07-18 16:11 ` Stefan Berger
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