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From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<peterz@infradead.org>, <rppt@kernel.org>,
	<binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>, <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	<john.allen@amd.com>, <gil.neiger@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2023 20:05:19 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8dec8b09-2568-a664-e51d-e6ff9f49e7de@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZJ6uKZToMPfwoXW6@chao-email>


On 6/30/2023 6:27 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 05:34:28PM +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> On 6/17/2023 2:57 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 16, 2023, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>>>> On 6/16/2023 7:58 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Jun 08, 2023, Weijiang Yang wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/6/2023 5:08 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>>>>>>> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 12:08:46AM -0400, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>>>>>>>> Add handling for Control Protection (#CP) exceptions(vector 21).
>>>>>>>> The new vector is introduced for Intel's Control-Flow Enforcement
>>>>>>>> Technology (CET) relevant violation cases.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Although #CP belongs contributory exception class, but the actual
>>>>>>>> effect is conditional on CET being exposed to guest. If CET is not
>>>>>>>> available to guest, #CP falls back to non-contributory and doesn't
>>>>>>>> have an error code.
>>>>>>> This sounds weird. is this the hardware behavior? If yes, could you
>>>>>>> point us to where this behavior is documented?
>>>>>> It's not SDM documented behavior.
>>>>> The #CP behavior needs to be documented.  Please pester whoever you need to in
>>>>> order to make that happen.
>>>> Do you mean documentation for #CP as an generic exception or the behavior in
>>>> KVM as this patch shows?
>>> As I pointed out two *years* ago, this entry in the SDM
>>>
>>>     — The field's deliver-error-code bit (bit 11) is 1 if each of the following
>>>       holds: (1) the interruption type is hardware exception; (2) bit 0
>>>       (corresponding to CR0.PE) is set in the CR0 field in the guest-state area;
>>>       (3) IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] is read as 0 (see Appendix A.1); and (4) the vector
>>>       indicates one of the following exceptions: #DF (vector 8), #TS (10),
>>>       #NP (11), #SS (12), #GP (13), #PF (14), or #AC (17).
>>>
>>> needs to read something like
>>>
>>>     — The field's deliver-error-code bit (bit 11) is 1 if each of the following
>>>       holds: (1) the interruption type is hardware exception; (2) bit 0
>>>       (corresponding to CR0.PE) is set in the CR0 field in the guest-state area;
>>>       (3) IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] is read as 0 (see Appendix A.1); and (4) the vector
>>>       indicates one of the following exceptions: #DF (vector 8), #TS (10),
>>>       #NP (11), #SS (12), #GP (13), #PF (14), #AC (17), or #CP (21)[1]
>>>
>>>       [1] #CP has an error code if and only if IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 enumerates
>>>           support for the 1-setting of CR4.CET.
>> Hi, Sean,
>>
>> I sent above change request to Gil(added in cc), but he shared different
>> opinion on this issue:
>>
>>
>> "It is the case that all CET-capable parts enumerate IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] as 1.
>>
>>   However, there were earlier parts without CET that enumerated
>> IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] as 0.
>>
>>   On those parts, an attempt to inject an exception with vector 21 (#CP) with
>> an error code would fail.
>>
>> (Injection of exception 21 with no error code would be allowed.)
>>
>>   It may make things clearer if we document the statement above (all
>> CET-capable parts enumerate IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] as 1).
>>
>> I will see if we can update future revisions of the SDM to clarify this."
>>
>>
>> Then if this is the case,  kvm needs to check IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] before
>> inject exception to nested VM.
> And KVM can hide CET from guests if IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] is 0.

Yes, this scratch patch didn't cover cross-check with CET enabling, thanks!

>
>> And this patch could be removed, instead need another patch like below:
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index ad35355ee43e..6b33aacc8587 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@
>>   #define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_MASK    0x003c000000000000LLU
>>   #define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_WB    6LLU
>>   #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT        0x0040000000000000LLU
>> +#define VMX_BASIC_CHECK_ERRCODE    0x0140000000000000LLU
>>
>>   /* Resctrl MSRs: */
>>   /* - Intel: */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> index 85cffeae7f10..4b1ed4dc03bc 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
>> @@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout(void)
>>       return    (((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) & VMX_BASIC_INOUT);
>>   }
>>
>> +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_check_errcode(void)
>> +{
>> +    return    (((u64)vmcs_config.basic_cap << 32) &
>> VMX_BASIC_CHECK_ERRCODE);
>> +}
>> +
>>   static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis(void)
>>   {
>>       return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS &&
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
>> index 78524daa2cb2..92aa4fc3d233 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
>> @@ -1227,9 +1227,9 @@ static int vmx_restore_vmx_basic(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
>> u64 data)
>>   {
>>       const u64 feature_and_reserved =
>>           /* feature (except bit 48; see below) */
>> -        BIT_ULL(49) | BIT_ULL(54) | BIT_ULL(55) |
>> +        BIT_ULL(49) | BIT_ULL(54) | BIT_ULL(55) | BIT_ULL(56) |
>>           /* reserved */
>> -        BIT_ULL(31) | GENMASK_ULL(47, 45) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 56);
>> +        BIT_ULL(31) | GENMASK_ULL(47, 45) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 57);
>>       u64 vmx_basic = vmcs_config.nested.basic;
>>
>>       if (!is_bitwise_subset(vmx_basic, data, feature_and_reserved))
>> @@ -2873,7 +2873,8 @@ static int nested_check_vm_entry_controls(struct
>> kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>           should_have_error_code =
>>               intr_type == INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION && prot_mode &&
>>               x86_exception_has_error_code(vector);
>> -        if (CC(has_error_code != should_have_error_code))
>> +        if (!cpu_has_vmx_basic_check_errcode() &&
> We can skip computing should_have_error_code. and we should check if
> IA32_VMX_BASIC[56] is set for this vCPU (i.e. in vmx->nested.msrs.basic)
> rather than host/kvm capability.

Oops, I confused myself, yes, need to reshape the code a bit and use 
msrs.basic

to check the bit status, thanks!

>
>> +            CC(has_error_code != should_have_error_code))
>>               return -EINVAL;
>>
>>           /* VM-entry exception error code */
>> @@ -6986,6 +6987,8 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_basic(struct
>> nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
>>
>>       if (cpu_has_vmx_basic_inout())
>>           msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_INOUT;
>> +    if (cpu_has_vmx_basic_check_errcode())
>> +        msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_CHECK_ERRCODE;
>>   }
>>
>>   static void nested_vmx_setup_cr_fixed(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index d70f2e94b187..95c0eab7805c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -2748,7 +2748,7 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config
>> *vmcs_conf,
>>       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, misc_msr);
>>
>>       vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
>> -    vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
>> +    vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x7fff;
>>
>>       vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
>>
>>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-30 12:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-11  4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24  8:19     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25  6:10   ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30  3:51     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08       ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31  1:11         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:58             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  9:24                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  8:38   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  5:42     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  2:02     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06  9:08   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:01     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  6:56         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  9:28             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30  9:34             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27               ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05                 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-06-30 15:05                   ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01  1:58                       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01  1:54                     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21                 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01  1:57                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03   ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08  6:06     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:21   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:49     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:32         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28  1:42             ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07  9:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28       ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23  8:57   ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24  2:55     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  8:59     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  3:50         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24  6:35   ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24  8:07     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24  0:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 20:50       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27  1:53         ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11  4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  0:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16  1:00     ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16  8:25   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19  6:41       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26  6:46           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17  7:44           ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26               ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20  1:58                 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  5:26                 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20  8:03                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  8:09                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20  9:14                       ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46                     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20  1:55               ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10  0:28       ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11  1:24           ` Yang, Weijiang

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