From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: serge@hallyn.com, serue@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: A basic question about the security_* hooks
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2009 09:51:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9291.1262011906@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 28 Dec 2009 20:51:49 +0900." <200912282051.BIF64080.VOMtFOOLSHJFFQ@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
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On Mon, 28 Dec 2009 20:51:49 +0900, Tetsuo Handa said:
(Hit send too soon)
> Both SELinux and TOMOYO have ability to cover all processes (from /sbin/init
> till /sbin/poweroff) or targeted processes (e.g. only daemons). But SELinux is
> not widely used for protecting all processes. TOMOYO can provide some
> protection for processes which SELinux doesn't protect.
OK, this was what I was talking about - what processes does TOMOYO protect
that SELinux doesn't? Or are you suggesting "use TOMOYO when using the SELinux
'targeted' policy that only tracks some processes"? It would seem that a better
solution there would be to just go ahead and use the 'strict' or 'mls' policies
if you want coverage of all processes - having some processes under SELinux
and some under TOMOYO rules is just asking for confusion...
> Also, people know we sometimes need to restrict string parameters for avoiding
> unwanted consequence. TOMOYO can pay attention to string parameters whereas
> SELinux can't.
Which string parameters are these? Perhaps a better approach than trying to
layer all of TOMOYO on SELinux is to create a small targeted "look at string
parameters" LSM and run *that* on top. Would require LSM stacking, but so would
doing all of TOMOYO.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-12-28 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-12-24 2:29 A basic question about the security_* hooks Michael Stone
2009-12-24 4:50 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-12-24 12:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-12-24 21:55 ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-12-25 0:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-31 17:50 ` David P. Quigley
2010-01-04 2:12 ` Paul Moore
2009-12-24 7:36 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2009-12-24 18:57 ` Samir Bellabes
2009-12-25 0:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-25 1:11 ` Michael Stone
2009-12-25 5:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-26 19:50 ` Michael Stone
2009-12-27 3:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-27 4:02 ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-12-27 10:56 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-12-27 14:54 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-27 20:28 ` David Wagner
2009-12-28 2:08 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-12-28 11:51 ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-12-28 14:45 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-12-28 14:51 ` Valdis.Kletnieks [this message]
2009-12-29 13:01 ` Label based MAC + Name based MAC (was Re: A basic question about the security_* hooks) Tetsuo Handa
2010-01-02 13:56 ` A basic question about the security_* hooks Pavel Machek
2009-12-28 15:24 ` Kyle Moffett
2009-12-29 1:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-12-29 19:02 ` Kyle Moffett
2009-12-30 19:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-12-27 0:33 ` Mimi Zohar
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