From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: sys: fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 17:11:53 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9521b7db-0ff5-21db-f744-b818cd640783@embeddedor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4hG_ue7WPWZHzQmKXpZD-ZCovXOUHurVa59-Zs6bdBe=w@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/18/2018 05:08 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>
>> Oh I see now. Just to double check, then something like the following would
>> be broken too, because is basically the same as the code above, and well, it
>> doesn't make much sense to store the value returned by macro
>> array_index_nospec into x, correct?:
>
> Correct, broken:
>
>>
>> bool foo(int x)
>> {
>> if(x >= MAX)
>> return false;
>
> Under speculation we may not return here when x is greater than max.
>
>> x = array_index_nospec(x, MAX);
>
> x is now sanitized under speculation to zero, but the compiler would
> likely just throw this away because nothing consumes it.
>
>> return true;
>> }
>>
>> int vulnerable(int x)
>> {
>> if(!foo(x))
>> return -1;
>
> cpu might speculate that this branch is not taken...
>
>>
>> temp = array[x];
>
> ...so x had better be bounded here, otherwise Spectre.
>
I got it.
I appreciate the feedback.
Thanks, Dan.
--
Gustavo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-18 22:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-15 3:00 [PATCH] kernel: sys: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-15 22:08 ` Andrew Morton
2018-05-15 22:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-15 22:57 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 19:04 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 19:21 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 20:38 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 20:44 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 21:27 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 21:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 22:01 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 22:08 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 22:11 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-05-21 0:50 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-21 2:00 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-22 20:50 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 5:03 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-23 5:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 5:22 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-23 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-23 13:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 15:07 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-23 15:57 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 16:27 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-23 16:31 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-25 18:11 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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