Re: [PATCH V8 41/44] kmap: Ensure kmap works for devmap pages

Dan Williams
2022-03-01T20:05:43Z

On Tue, Mar 1, 2022 at 11:45 AM Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 04, 2022 at 01:07:10PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 27, 2022 at 9:55 AM <ira.weiny@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> > >
> > > Users of devmap pages should not have to know that the pages they are
> > > operating on are special.
> >
> > How about get straight to the point without any ambiguous references:
> >
> > Today, kmap_{local_page,atomic} handles granting access to HIGHMEM
> > pages without the caller needing to know if the page is HIGHMEM, or
> > not. Use that existing infrastructure to grant access to PKS/PGMAP
> > access protected pages.
>
> This sounds better. Thanks.
>
> >
> > > Co-opt the kmap_{local_page,atomic}() to mediate access to PKS protected
> > > pages via the devmap facility. kmap_{local_page,atomic}() are both
> > > thread local mappings so they work well with the thread specific
> > > protections available.
> > >
> > > kmap(), on the other hand, allows for global mappings to be established,
> > > Which is incompatible with the underlying PKS facility.
> >
> > Why is kmap incompatible with PKS? I know why, but this is a claim
> > without evidence. If you documented that in a previous patch, there's
> > no harm and copying and pasting into this one. A future git log user
> > will thank you for not making them go to lore to try to find the one
> > patch with the details.
>
> Good point.
>
> > Extra credit for creating a PKS theory of
> > operation document with this detail, unless I missed that?
>
> Well... I've documented and mentioned the thread-local'ness of PKS a lot but
> I'm pretty close to all of this so it is hard for me to remember where and to
> what degree that is documented. I've already reworked the PKS documentation a
> bit. So I'll review that.
>
> >
> > > For this reason
> > > kmap() is not supported. Rather than leave the kmap mappings to fault
> > > at random times when users may access them,
> >
> > Is that a problem?
>
> No.

What I meant was how random is random and is it distinguishable from
direct page_address() usage where there is no explicit early failure
path?

>
> > This instrumentation is also insufficient for
> > legitimate usages of page_address().
>
> True. Although with this protection those access' are no longer legitimate.
> And it sounds like it may be worth putting a call in page_address() as well.
>
> > Might as well rely on the kernel
> > developer community being able to debug PKS WARN() splats back to the
> > source because that will need to be done regardless, given kmap() is
> > not the only source of false positive access violations.
>
> I disagree but I'm happy to drop pgmap_protection_flag_invalid() if that is the
> consensus.
>
> The reason I disagree is that it is generally better to catch errors early
> rather than later. Furthermore, this does not change the permissions. Which
> means the actual invalid access will also get flagged at the point of use.
> This allows more debugging information for the user.
>
> Do you feel that strongly about removing pgmap_protection_flag_invalid()?

You haven't convinced me that it matters yet. Do you have an example
of a kmap() pointer dereference PKS splat where it's not clear from
the backtrace from the fault handler that a kmap path was involved?

At a minimum if it stays it seems like something that should be
wrapped by VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_PAGE() like other page relative memory
debugging extra checks that get disabled by CONFIG_DEBUG_VM, but the
assertion that "early is better" needs evidence that "later is too
ambiguous".