From: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
security@kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2011 06:57:55 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <BANLkTi=dTHGK1QVs+g2tA6WocQ64SPPF3g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1308917362-4795-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com>
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 5:39 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> taskstats information may be used for gathering private information.
> E.g. for openssh and vsftpd daemons read_characters/write_characters may
> be used to learn the precise password length. Restrict it to processes
> being able to ptrace the target process.
>
> For TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASK the fix is euid check instead of
> a ptrace check as the handler is processed in the context of the target
> process, not the listener process'. When ptrace_task_may_access_current()
> is introduced, it should be used instead of euid check. Currently there
> is a small race when a process temporarily changes its euid (e.g. to
> access user's files), until the process sets euid back user's processes
> may gather privileged process' statistics.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> ---
> kernel/taskstats.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
> index 9ffea36..d92c95a 100644
> --- a/kernel/taskstats.c
> +++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> #include <linux/cgroup.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
> #include <net/genetlink.h>
> #include <asm/atomic.h>
>
> @@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct sk_buff *skb_next, *skb_cur = skb;
> void *reply = genlmsg_data(genlhdr);
> int rc, delcount = 0;
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> + struct task_struct *task;
>
> rc = genlmsg_end(skb, reply);
> if (rc < 0) {
> @@ -142,6 +145,15 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
> rc = 0;
> down_read(&listeners->sem);
Why not grab RCU lock here
> list_for_each_entry(s, &listeners->list, list) {
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
You'll end up grabbing RCU read lock too often here, do you need to?
> + task = find_task_by_vpid(s->pid);
> + if (!task || __task_cred(task)->euid != cred->euid) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + continue;
> + }
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
Release the lock prior to up_read()
> skb_next = NULL;
> if (!list_is_last(&s->list, &listeners->list)) {
> skb_next = skb_clone(skb_cur, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -199,14 +211,19 @@ static void fill_stats(struct task_struct *tsk, struct taskstats *stats)
> static int fill_stats_for_pid(pid_t pid, struct taskstats *stats)
> {
> struct task_struct *tsk;
> + int rc = -ESRCH;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
> + if (tsk && !ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
> + tsk = NULL;
> + rc = -EACCES;
> + }
> if (tsk)
> get_task_struct(tsk);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> if (!tsk)
> - return -ESRCH;
> + return rc;
> fill_stats(tsk, stats);
> put_task_struct(tsk);
> return 0;
> @@ -224,6 +241,10 @@ static int fill_stats_for_tgid(pid_t tgid, struct taskstats *stats)
> */
> rcu_read_lock();
> first = find_task_by_vpid(tgid);
> + if (first && !ptrace_may_access(first, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
> + rc = -EACCES;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> if (!first || !lock_task_sighand(first, &flags))
> goto out;
Balbir Singh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-06-29 1:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-24 12:09 [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 1:27 ` Balbir Singh [this message]
2011-06-29 11:42 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:17 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02 7:36 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 2:57 ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-04 17:45 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 8:55 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 11:53 ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 16:23 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-09 15:36 ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-11 14:07 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:09 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30 7:57 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 10:59 ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 12:08 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 16:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01 3:02 ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 16:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:20 ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:39 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-20 3:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20 5:47 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-19 17:47 ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 18:29 ` Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:32 ` Linus Torvalds
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