From: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@amazon.com>
To: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@amazon.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <graf@amazon.de>,
<dwmw2@infradead.org>, <pdurrant@amazon.com>,
<mlevitsk@redhat.com>, <jgowans@amazon.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<decui@microsoft.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<amoorthy@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] KVM: x86: Take mem attributes into account when faulting memory
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 15:21:02 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D3MJJCTNY7OM.WOB5W8AVBH9G@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240609154945.55332-17-nsaenz@amazon.com>
On Sun Jun 9, 2024 at 3:49 PM UTC, Nicolas Saenz Julienne wrote:
> Take into account access restrictions memory attributes when faulting
> guest memory. Prohibited memory accesses will cause an user-space fault
> exit.
>
> Additionally, bypass a warning in the !tdp case. Access restrictions in
> guest page tables might not necessarily match the host pte's when memory
> attributes are in use.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenz@amazon.com>
I now realize that only taking into account memory attributes during
faults isn't good enough for VSM. We should check the attributes anytime
KVM takes GPAs as input for any action initiated by the guest. If the
memory attributes are incompatible with such action, it should be
stopped. Failure to do so opens side channels that unprivileged VTLs can
abuse to infer information about privileged VTL. Some examples I came up
with:
- Guest page walks: VTL0 could install malicious directory entries that
point to GPAs only visible to VTL1. KVM will happily continue the
walk. Among other things, this could be use to infer VTL1's GVA->GPA
mappings.
- PV interfaces like the Hyper-V TSC page or VP assist page, could be
used to modify portions of VTL1 memory.
- Hyper-V hypercalls that take GPAs as input/output can be abused in a
myriad of ways. Including ones that exit into user-space.
We would be protected against all these if we implemented the memory
access restrictions through the memory slots API. As is, it has the
drawback of having to quiesce the whole VM for any non-trivial slot
modification (i.e. VSM's memory protections). But if we found a way to
speed up the slot updates we could rely on that, and avoid having to
teach kvm_read/write_guest() and friends to deal with memattrs. Note
that we would still need to use memory attributes to request for faults
to exit onto user-space on those select GPAs. Any opinions or
suggestions?
Note that, for now, I'll stick with the memory attributes approach to
see what the full solution looks like.
Nicolas
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-22 15:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-09 15:49 [PATCH 00/18] Introducing Core Building Blocks for Hyper-V VSM Emulation Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 01/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce XMM output support Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-07-08 14:59 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-07-17 14:12 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-07-29 13:53 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-08-05 14:08 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 02/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce helpers to check if VSM is exposed to guest Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 03/18] hyperv-tlfs: Update struct hv_send_ipi{_ex}'s declarations Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 04/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce VTL awareness to Hyper-V's PV-IPIs Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 18:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 14:52 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce MP_STATE_HV_INACTIVE_VTL Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 19:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:33 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-18 7:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 06/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Exit on Get/SetVpRegisters hcall Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 07/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Exit on TranslateVirtualAddress hcall Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Exit on StartVirtualProcessor and GetVpIndexFromApicId hcalls Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 09/18] KVM: Define and communicate KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT RWX flags to userspace Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 10/18] KVM: x86: Keep track of instruction length during faults Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 19:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 11/18] KVM: x86: Pass the instruction length on memory fault user-space exits Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 19:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 15:53 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce infrastructure to handle non-executable mappings Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Avoid warning when installing non-private memory attributes Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 19:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Init memslot if memory attributes available Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 15/18] KVM: Introduce RWX memory attributes Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 16/18] KVM: x86: Take mem attributes into account when faulting memory Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-08-22 15:21 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne [this message]
2024-08-22 16:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-13 18:26 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 17/18] KVM: Introduce traces to track memory attributes modification Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-06-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Handle VSM hcalls in user-space Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-07-03 9:55 ` [PATCH 00/18] Introducing Core Building Blocks for Hyper-V VSM Emulation Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-07-03 12:48 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2024-07-03 13:18 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
2024-09-13 19:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-16 16:32 ` Nicolas Saenz Julienne
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