From: "Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>
To: "David Windsor" <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>, "Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>,
"Emil Tsalapatis" <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Ondrej Mosnacek" <omosnace@redhat.com>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
"Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling
Date: Wed, 08 Jul 2026 05:12:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <DJSV0P2OINKE.34OCOC34KFEEF@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260708000956.46138-1-dwindsor@gmail.com>
On Wed Jul 8, 2026 at 2:09 AM CEST, David Windsor wrote:
> Many in-kernel LSMs (SELinux, Smack, IMA) store security labels in
> extended attributes. For these LSMs, atomic labeling during inode
> creation is critical: if the inode becomes accessible before its xattr
> is set, it is briefly unlabeled, which can disrupt LSMs making policy
> decisions based on file labels.
>
> Existing LSMs solve this by setting xattrs directly in the
> inode_init_security hook, which runs before the inode becomes
> accessible. BPF LSM programs currently lack this capability because
> the hook uses an output parameter (xattr_count) that BPF programs
> cannot write to, and existing kfuncs like bpf_set_dentry_xattr
> require a dentry that isn't available until after the inode is
> accessible.
>
> This series introduces the bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc, which takes
> the combined inode_init_security xattr context argument and claims a
> slot in it via the new security_lsmxattr_add() LSM helper.
>
There are various CI failures in newly added tests, I don't think any of them
are passing. Please fix before respinning.
https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/12730
E.g. both test_init_inode_xattr and test_init_inode_xattr_slot do not have
expected results.
pw-bot: cr
> [...]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-08 3:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 0:09 [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-07-08 0:09 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 1/3] security: rework inode_init_security xattr handling David Windsor
2026-07-08 0:09 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-07-08 0:09 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc David Windsor
2026-07-08 3:12 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi [this message]
2026-07-08 12:51 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
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