From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753877AbbEZRKJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 May 2015 13:10:09 -0400 Received: from www.safe-mail.net ([212.29.227.230]:36930 "EHLO tapuz.safe-mail.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753171AbbEZRKG (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 May 2015 13:10:06 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 6504 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Tue, 26 May 2015 13:10:06 EDT DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=N1-0105; d=Safe-mail.net; b=JAW31NW66l3nMxK1uuvkxp+jLJtODuzR0i1kfNlDN+bxLIPxv3V1n2qdpuQGG/OJ I6EUKTxI/VVR8wzx+WchtqxR8q1VFdI8yIg+TG9ZwV+AvMCNPeeI06uWDq7mMN0e bcBcBvnhoE5kWZPHj7M5JjNbku23Z3NretHrFki/A78=; Subject: RAM encryption and key storing in CPU Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 11:21:40 -0400 From: "someone called" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-SMType: Regular X-SMRef: N1-AKfnFb7w6j Message-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SMSignature: joqUKzrm/Qt1/gsSK+0v6ffVcvgCVKflPzJZmROXBTMtLf1ykPUGUlACnCxCTIKJ PACz1WbmwJXHGnD1m82y0klypRmpRloUPPlmAaWiAZApOzUTFfI/jSql/FCt2jM+ oOEeSSaQDn4q7cYSfswMp8P9mZbbdaytDxVYa/zrnYY= Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hello, ========== Problem: Everything is stored in plaintext in the Memory. So if although full disc encryption is used on an ex.: Linux Desktop, it is possible to copy the content of the memory, while the notebook was on suspend or it was running: https://citp.princeton.edu/research/memory/media/ ========== Solution: Can we (optionally*) encrypt the content of the memory and store the key for decryption in the CPU to avoid these kind of attacks in general? Example patches (I am NOT related to them): https://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor Is this solution already in the Linux kernel? If yes, how can a Linux enduser turn it on? If no, how can we get the code/idea in the mainline? What are the arguments against it? *if someone would want to harden it's Linux Desktop (since notebooks could be stolen..) it could turn on this feature to avoid a policy to always turn off the notebook while not using it. Thank you for your comments.