From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux.dev, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] iommu/vt-d: Add opt-in for ATS support on discrete devices
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 08:23:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y/3yNaQD5Pkvf61k@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230228023341.973671-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
On Tue, Feb 28, 2023 at 10:33:41AM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
> In normal processing of PCIe ATS requests, the IOMMU performs address
> translation and returns the device a physical memory address which
> will be stored in that device's IOTLB. The device may subsequently
> issue Translated DMA request containing physical memory address. The
> IOMMU only checks that the device was allowed to issue such requests
> and does not attempt to validate the physical address.
>
> The Intel IOMMU implementation only allows PCIe ATS on several SOC-
> integrated devices which are opt-in’ed through the ACPI tables to
> prevent any compromised device from accessing arbitrary physical
> memory.
>
> Add a kernel option intel_iommu=relax_ats to allow users to have an
> opt-in to allow turning on ATS at as wish, especially for CSP-owned
> vertical devices. In any case, risky devices are not allowed to use
> ATS.
Why is this an intel specific option? all it does is effectively
disable untrusted? Why not a global option? All iommu with ATS will
need this?
Also, why doesn't a "CSP" set their ACPI to make the devices they want
to use ATS with trusted instead of this?
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-28 12:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-28 2:33 [PATCH 1/1] iommu/vt-d: Add opt-in for ATS support on discrete devices Lu Baolu
2023-02-28 12:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2023-03-01 4:22 ` Baolu Lu
2023-03-01 14:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2023-03-01 17:15 ` Robin Murphy
2023-03-01 17:42 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2023-03-01 18:19 ` Robin Murphy
2023-03-02 2:30 ` Baolu Lu
2023-03-03 8:19 ` Tian, Kevin
2023-03-03 9:51 ` Baolu Lu
2023-03-03 13:18 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2023-03-07 5:20 ` Tian, Kevin
2023-03-02 1:56 ` Baolu Lu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=Y/3yNaQD5Pkvf61k@nvidia.com \
--to=jgg@nvidia.com \
--cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox