public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in get/set_nmi_mask
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 18:54:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3aDTvglaSfhG8Tg@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221117143242.102721-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>

On Thu, Nov 17, 2022, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> From: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
> 
> VMCB intr_ctrl bit12 (V_NMI_MASK) is set by the processor when handling
> NMI in guest and is cleared after the NMI is handled. Treat V_NMI_MASK
> as read-only in the hypervisor except for the SMM case where hypervisor
> before entring and after leaving SMM mode requires to set and unset
> V_NMI_MASK.
> 
> Adding API(get_vnmi_vmcb) in order to return the correct vmcb for L1 or
> L2.
> 
> Maxim:
>    - made set_vnmi_mask/clear_vnmi_mask/is_vnmi_mask warn if called
>      without vNMI enabled
>    - clear IRET intercept in svm_set_nmi_mask even with vNMI
> 
> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 08a7b2a0a29f3a..c16f68f6c4f7d7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -3618,13 +3618,29 @@ static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
>  
>  static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> -	return !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
> +		return is_vnmi_mask_set(svm);
> +	else
> +		return !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
>  }
>  
>  static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>  
> +	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
> +		if (masked)
> +			set_vnmi_mask(svm);

I believe not setting INTERCEPT_IRET is correct, but only because the existing
code is unnecessary.  And this all very subtly relies on KVM_REQ_EVENT being set
and/or KVM already being in kvm_check_and_inject_events().

When NMIs become unblocked, INTERCEPT_IRET can be cleared, but KVM should also
pending KVM_REQ_EVENT.  AFAICT, that doesn't happen when this is called via the
emulator.  Ah, because em_iret() only handles RM for Intel's restricted guest
crap.  I.e. it "works" only because it never happens.  All other flows set
KVM_REQ_EVENT when toggling NMI blocking, e.g. the RSM path of kvm_smm_changed().

And when NMIs become blocked, there's no need to force INTERCEPT_IRET in this
code because kvm_check_and_inject_events() will request an NMI window and set the
intercept if necessary, and all paths that set NMI blocking are guaranteed to
reach kvm_check_and_inject_events() before entering the guest.

  1. RSM => kvm_smm_changed() sets KVM_REQ_EVENT
  2. enter_smm() is only called from within kvm_check_and_inject_events(),
     before pending NMIs are processed (yay priority)
  3. emulator_set_nmi_mask() never blocks NMIs, only does the half-baked IRET emulation
  4. kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_event() sets KVM_REQ_EVENT

So, can you add a prep patch to drop the forced INTERCEPT_IRET?  That way the
logic for vNMI and !vNMI is the same.

> +		else {
> +			clear_vnmi_mask(svm);

This is the only code that sets/clears the vNMI mask, so rather than have set/clear
helpers, what about a single helper to do the dirty work? 

> +			if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
> +				svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
> +		}
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (masked) {
>  		vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_NMI_MASK;
>  		if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index f5383104d00580..bf7f4851dee204 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
>  extern bool npt_enabled;
>  extern int vgif;
>  extern bool intercept_smi;
> +extern bool vnmi;
>  
>  enum avic_modes {
>  	AVIC_MODE_NONE = 0,
> @@ -531,6 +532,57 @@ static inline bool is_x2apic_msrpm_offset(u32 offset)
>  	       (msr < (APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x100));
>  }
>  
> +static inline struct vmcb *get_vnmi_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	if (!vnmi)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
> +		return svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr;
> +	else
> +		return svm->vmcb01.ptr;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> +
> +	if (vmcb)
> +		return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);
> +	else
> +		return false;

Maybe just this?

	return vmcb && (vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);

Or if an inner helper is added:

	return vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb);

> +}
> +
> +static inline bool is_vnmi_mask_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> +
> +	if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmcb))

Rather than WARN, add an inner __is_vnmi_enabled() that takes the vnmi_vmcb.
Actually, if you do that, the test/set/clear helpers can go away entirely.

> +		return false;
> +
> +	return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_vnmi_mask(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> +
> +	if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmcb))
> +		return;
> +
> +	vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void clear_vnmi_mask(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> +	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> +
> +	if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmcb))
> +		return;
> +
> +	vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
> +}

These helpers can all go in svm.  There are no users oustide of svm.c, and
unless I'm misunderstanding how nested works, there should never be oustide users.

E.g. with HF_NMI_MASK => svm->nmi_masked, the end result can be something like:

static bool __is_vnmi_enabled(struct *vmcb)
{
	return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);
}

static bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);

	return vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb);
}

static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);

	if (vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb))
		return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK);
	else
		return !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
}

static void svm_set_or_clear_vnmi_mask(struct vmcb *vmcb, bool set)
{
	if (set)
		vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
	else
		vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
}

static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
{
	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
	struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);

	if (vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb)) {
		if (masked)
			vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
		else
			vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
	} else {
		svm->nmi_masked = masked;
	}

	if (!masked)
		svm_disable_iret_interception(svm);
}

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-17 18:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-17 14:32 [PATCH 00/13] SVM: vNMI (with my fixes) Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 01/13] KVM: nSVM: don't sync back tlb_ctl on nested VM exit Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 02/13] KVM: nSVM: don't call nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02 on each " Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:04   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 11:07     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:51       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 03/13] KVM: nSVM: rename nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02 to nested_sync_int_ctl_from_vmcb02 Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 04/13] KVM: nSVM: clean up copying of int_ctl fields back to vmcb01/vmcb12 Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 11:10     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/cpu: Add CPUID feature bit for VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 06/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI bit definition Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 16:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 17:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 20:33         ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 20:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in get/set_nmi_mask Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-11-21 12:36     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:18       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-12-04 18:42     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-06 18:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: SVM: Report NMI not allowed when Guest busy handling VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 09/13] KVM: SVM: allow NMI window with vNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 18:21   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 13:40     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 10/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in inject_nmi Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:12   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 11/13] KVM: nSVM: implement nested VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 12/13] KVM: nSVM: emulate VMEXIT_INVALID case for " Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:18   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 13/13] KVM: SVM: Enable VNMI feature Maxim Levitsky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Y3aDTvglaSfhG8Tg@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=babu.moger@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jing2.liu@intel.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=sandipan.das@amd.com \
    --cc=santosh.shukla@amd.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=wyes.karny@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox