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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in get/set_nmi_mask
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 17:18:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3uzAM3/XrUPRpgH@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4aadf4616e4f1c6219e7c83ee491494feefa78e1.camel@redhat.com>

On Mon, Nov 21, 2022, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Thu, 2022-11-17 at 18:54 +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > E.g. with HF_NMI_MASK => svm->nmi_masked, the end result can be something like:
> > 
> > static bool __is_vnmi_enabled(struct *vmcb)
> > {
> >         return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);
> > }
> > 
> > static bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > {
> >         struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> > 
> >         return vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb);
> > }
> > 
> > static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> >         struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> >         struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> > 
> >         if (vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb))
> >                 return !!(vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK);
> >         else
> >                 return !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
> > }
> > 
> > static void svm_set_or_clear_vnmi_mask(struct vmcb *vmcb, bool set)
> > {
> >         if (set)
> >                 vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
> >         else
> >                 vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
> > }
> > 
> > static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
> > {
> >         struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> >         struct vmcb *vmcb = get_vnmi_vmcb(svm);
> > 
> >         if (vmcb && __is_vnmi_enabled(vmcb)) {
> >                 if (masked)
> >                         vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
> >                 else
> >                         vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
> >         } else {
> >                 svm->nmi_masked = masked;
> >         }
> > 
> >         if (!masked)
> >                 svm_disable_iret_interception(svm);
> > }
> 
> OK, this is one of the ways to do it, makes sense overall.
> I actualy wanted to do something like that but opted to not touch
> the original code too much, but only what I needed. I can do this
> in a next version.

After looking at more of this code, I think having get_vnmi_vmcb() is a mistake.
It just ends up being a funky wrapper to the current svm->vmcb.  And the manual
check on the "vnmi" global is pointless.  If KVM sets V_NMI_ENABLE in any VMCB
when vnmi=false, then that's a KVM bug.

Dropping the wrapper eliminates the possibility of a NULL VMCB pointer, and IMO
yields far more readable code.


static bool is_vnmi_enabled(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
	return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_ENABLE);
}

static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
		return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_MASK);
	else
		return !!(vcpu->arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
}

static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
{
	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

	if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
		if (masked)
			svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_MASK;
		else
			svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_MASK;
	} else {
		svm->nmi_masked = masked;
	}

	if (!masked)
		svm_disable_iret_interception(svm);
}

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-21 17:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-17 14:32 [PATCH 00/13] SVM: vNMI (with my fixes) Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 01/13] KVM: nSVM: don't sync back tlb_ctl on nested VM exit Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 02/13] KVM: nSVM: don't call nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02 on each " Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:04   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 11:07     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:51       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 03/13] KVM: nSVM: rename nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02 to nested_sync_int_ctl_from_vmcb02 Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 04/13] KVM: nSVM: clean up copying of int_ctl fields back to vmcb01/vmcb12 Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 11:10     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86/cpu: Add CPUID feature bit for VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 06/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI bit definition Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 16:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 17:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-17 20:33         ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 20:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 07/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in get/set_nmi_mask Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 12:36     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:18       ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2022-12-04 18:42     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-12-06 18:27       ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 08/13] KVM: SVM: Report NMI not allowed when Guest busy handling VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 09/13] KVM: SVM: allow NMI window with vNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 18:21   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-21 13:40     ` Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 10/13] KVM: SVM: Add VNMI support in inject_nmi Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-21 17:12   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 11/13] KVM: nSVM: implement nested VNMI Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 12/13] KVM: nSVM: emulate VMEXIT_INVALID case for " Maxim Levitsky
2022-11-17 20:18   ` Sean Christopherson
2022-11-17 14:32 ` [PATCH 13/13] KVM: SVM: Enable VNMI feature Maxim Levitsky

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